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ABSTRACT

This booklet provides an introduction to the educational policy-making process for both experienced and new planners. Policy is defined as decisions designed to guide future decisions or to initiate and guide the implementation of previous decisions. Case studies of Burkina Faso, Jordan, Peru, and Thailand show how educational policy has played out in real world situations. In each case, the framework shows its value in explaining why certain policies were developed and implemented in this manner. (EH)

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Education policy-planning process: an applied framework

Wadi D. Haddad
with the assistance of Terri Demsky

ED 420 553

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Education policy-planning process: an applied framework

Wadi D. Haddad
with the assistance of Terri Demsky

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Fundamentals of educational planning

The booklets in this series are written primarily for two types of clientele: those engaged in educational planning and administration, in developing as well as developed countries; and others, less specialized, such as senior government officials and policy-makers who seek a more general understanding of educational planning and of how it is related to overall national development. They are intended to be of use either for private study or in formal training programmes.

Since this series was launched in 1967 practices and concepts of educational planning have undergone substantial change. Many of the assumptions which underlay earlier attempts to rationalize the process of educational development have been criticized or abandoned. Even if rigid mandatory centralized planning has now clearly proven to be inappropriate, this does not mean that all forms of planning have been dispensed with. On the contrary, the need for collecting data, evaluating the efficiency of existing programmes, undertaking a wide range of studies, exploring the future and fostering broad debate on these bases to guide educational policy and decision making has become even more acute than before.

The scope of educational planning has been broadened. In addition to the formal system of education, it is now applied to all other important educational efforts in nonformal settings. Attention to the growth and expansion of educational systems is being complemented and sometimes even replaced by a growing concern for the quality of the entire educational process and for the control of its results. Finally, planners and administrators have become more and more aware of the importance of implementation strategies and of the role of different regulatory mechanisms in this respect: the choice of financing methods, the examination and certification procedures or various other regulation and incentive structures. The concern of planners is twofold: to reach a better

understanding of the validity of education in its own empirically observed specific dimensions and to help in defining appropriate strategies for change.

The purpose of these booklets includes monitoring the evolution and change in educational policies and their effect upon educational planning requirements; highlighting current issues of educational planning and analyzing them in the context of their historical and societal setting; and disseminating methodologies of planning which can be applied in the context of both the developed and the developing countries.

In order to help the Institute identify the real up-to-date issues in educational planning and policy making in different parts of the world, an Editorial Board has been appointed, composed of two general editors and associate editors from different regions, all professionals of high repute in their own field. At the first meeting of this new Editorial Board in January 1990, its members identified key topics to be covered in the coming issues under the following headings:

1. Education and development
2. Equity considerations
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4. Structure, administration and management of education
5. Curriculum
6. Cost and financing of education
7. Planning techniques and approaches
8. Information systems, monitoring and evaluation

Each heading is covered by one or two associate editors.

The series has been carefully planned but no attempt has been made to avoid differences or even contradictions in the views expressed by the authors. The Institute itself does not wish to impose any official doctrine. Thus, while the views are the responsibility of the authors and may not always be shared by UNESCO or the IIEP, they warrant attention in the international forum of ideas. Indeed, one of the purposes of this series is to reflect a diversity of experience and opinions by giving different authors from a wide range of backgrounds and disciplines the opportunity of expressing their views on changing theories and practices in educational planning.

The present booklet is concerned with educational policy making. Educational planning and educational policy making are closely interconnected. Planners who do not understand how policies are formulated are not ensured of success; neither can they be of great help to policy-makers.

Indeed, planning entails a variety of processes, from the analysis of the present situation, the generation and assessment of policy options, to the careful preparation and monitoring of policy implementation, eventually leading to the redefinition of a new policy cycle. A variety of players intervene in these processes and if their interests are not carefully assessed and taken care of, then the policy or the plan will have every chance of failing. Educational history is full of reforms and plans which were never implemented precisely because the interests of certain key actors (parents or teachers) had not been taken into consideration, financial and human resources implications had not been carefully assessed or the system's managerial capacity had not systematically been taken into account.

The contents of the present booklet, which was written by Wadi Haddad with the assistance of Terri Demsky, contain an integrated model of educational decision making, illustrated by some four critically analyzed country case studies. The authors draw some lessons for the attention of educational planners. No one but Wadi Haddad, who was Chief Adviser to the President of Lebanon, the Executive Secretary of the World Conference on Education for All, and who is now Deputy Secretary of the World Bank, would have been in a better position to present this important topic.

Indeed, Aid agencies are now amongst the most powerful players in the decision-making process in many developing countries. As the case studies in this booklet illustrate, they have not always exercised their respective influential position in the best possible way. This booklet should definitely interest planners, decision-makers but also those donors who want to see educational change taking place with the good of the countries in mind.

I would like to thank Douglas M. Windham, Distinguished Service Professor at the State University of New York at Albany, special editor of this issue, for the very active role he played in its preparation.

Jacques Hallak
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Preface

The last two decades have seen a shift in the balance of interest between educational planning (with its emphasis on design, implementation, and monitoring) and educational policy making (with an emphasis on how educational policy alternatives are identified and final choices made). Increasingly, educational planners realize that both the constraints and opportunities they face are often traceable to the decisions made by policy-makers, usually before the professional planning staff has had a role in the discussion.

This shift in interest among planners has occurred simultaneously with the shift of educational responsibility to regional/local government agencies, to non government organizations, and to the private sector in many countries. This means that the planners' greater attention to policy-making issues is occurring at the very time that the policy-making process is increasing dramatically in complexity and diffusion. Obviously, educational policy making and educational planning have always been linked. What has not been linked is the utilization of the insights of the planners by the policy-makers. The question planners face now is whether the new policy-making environment will seriously constrain their attempts to ensure the early discussion of planning considerations as part of the educational policy-making process.

The Haddad/Demsky volume, *The policy-planning process in education: an applied framework*, is a superb introduction to the policy-making process for both experienced and new planners (as well as scholars, researchers, and other administrators who will benefit from the volume's lucid presentation). As defined, *policy*

represents decisions that are designed to guide (including to constrain) future decisions, or to initiate and guide the implementation of previous decisions. It is this time-bound nature of policy, and of policy making, that makes it such a critical concern for the educational planner. To a large extent, it is the planners' decisions that will be guided or constrained and it is the planners who will have to follow the implementation guidelines established by policy. For too long, planners have played a passive role in the policy-making process and have taken as given the set of delimitations imposed on them. There is an urgent need for planners to play a larger role in policy making, not as arbiters of policy decisions, but as partners in the policy-making process who can alert the decision-makers, political or administrative, to the costs and benefits (quantitative and qualitative) of alternative policy options.

The policy-making process, like educational development itself, is not a straightforward, easily understandable process. To help one better comprehend the untidiness and overlapping nature of how educational decisions are made, W.D. Haddad and T. Demsky present a framework which clarifies without doing violence to the complex reality of policy making. One of the requirements of their framework is the need to relax the assumptions of rationality and adequacy of information which underlie much of the traditional literature on planning and policy making. Rationality is still used in assessing the decisions made, it simply is not an assumed determinant of the decisions.

A major contribution of the Haddad/Demsky volume is that once the framework is posited, they proceed to examine its value in four real world cases – Burkina Faso, Jordan, Peru, and Thailand. In each case, the framework shows its value in explaining why certain policies were developed and why they were implemented in the manner they were. One point which should be emphasized here is the ability of the Haddad/Demsky framework to deal with the dynamics of the policy-planning cycle. It stresses the linkages between pre- and post-decision activities and emphasizes the continuing nature of the process as implementation by planners of one set of policy decisions establishes the context for the next cycle of policy and planning activities.

A special comment should be made about the contribution of the authors to a renewed optimism about what can be achieved in educational development. The failure of the traditional planning models and the recognition of the lack of rationality that can occur in policy making have combined to create an atmosphere of pessimism among some educationalists. W.D. Haddad and T. Demsky show that this current pessimism is as unjustified as was the naive optimism that characterized much of education in the 1960s and 1970s. W.D. Haddad and T. Demsky leave us with an improved understanding of the difficulty of our work as planners and policy analysts but with an enhanced confidence that we can do much more to improve both educational policy making and its implementation.

Douglas M. Windham
Associate Editor

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Introduction

This booklet analyzes educational policy making as a cornerstone of (Fundamental) educational planning. The policy analysis framework and case studies presented here provide planners with both a conceptual and an operational guide for understanding the critical linkages in the policy-planning process for education.

Chapter I offers an integrated model of educational decision making that emphasizes the role of the formal policy-making process (and its analytical rationality) within the context of the key policy actors (from the administrative and political context). To capture the details of the decision-making process itself, an analytical framework is presented that goes beyond the initial decision point to examine both the preceding actions (contextual assessment, technical analysis, and the generation, valuation, and selection of policy options) and the subsequent activities (planning and conducting implementation, impact assessment, and, where appropriate, remediation and redesign). Thus, the framework covers the full policy-planning process but with a focus on the facilitating and constraining effects that policy decisions (and how they were derived) can have on the choices available to educational planners.

In *Chapter II*, the framework is applied to four exemplary case studies of the educational policy cycle. The four cases (Peru, Jordan, Thailand, and Burkina Faso) were selected because sufficient data (and elapsed time) exist on each to allow discussion of the full policy cycle; also, the geographical, economic, pedagogical, and political diversity of the examples emphasizes that the policy framework presented here is generic and not limited in

applicability by any of these factors. *Chapter III* summarizes the lessons from and across the case studies, and identifies the elements in the policy-planning process that appear to have contributed to the success or failure of policy reforms. *Chapter IV* summarizes the implications for planners.

This analysis should be of value to educational planners in two major ways. First, the methodology of the framework and conclusions of the case studies should help in the analysis of current educational policies and decision-making procedures (an analysis *of* policy). Second, the framework can be applied to the evaluation of proposed policies and used to forecast policy outcomes and the probability of successful implementation, given the country context of fiscal and managerial capacity, political commitment, etc. (an analysis *for* policy). Planning that is not based on a solid understanding of educational policy making will fail; it will fail not primarily because of any technical planning errors but because the planners did not understand why and how these policies evolved and how planning results should lead to new cycles of policy analysis and formulation.

Chapter I. Framework for education policy analysis

The notion of educational planning – making the education sector grow and function more effectively – may implicitly suggest a well structured field of unambiguous issues, clearly defined objectives, mutually exclusive choices, undisputed causal relationships, predictable rationalities, and rational decision-makers. Accordingly, sector analysis has predominantly focused on the content – the 'what' of educational development: issues, policies, strategies, measures, outcomes, etc. In contrast to this simplistic vision, educational planning is actually a series of untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety of people and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively involved – technically and politically. It entails the *processes* through which issues are analyzed and *policies* are generated, implemented, assessed and redesigned. Accordingly, an analysis of the education sector implies an understanding of the education policy process itself – the 'how' and 'when' of educational development. The purpose of this section is to suggest a scheme or series of steps through which sound and workable policies can be formulated, and then, through effective planning, put into effect, evaluated and redesigned.

Policy definition and scope

Since the policy process is a crucial element in educational planning, it is essential to clarify the concepts of 'policy' and 'policy making' before proceeding any further. Understandably, competing definitions of 'policy' are numerous and varied. For the

purposes of this paper, policy is defined functionally to mean: *An explicit or implicit single decision or group of decisions which may set out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard action, or guide implementation of previous decisions.* Policy making is the first step in any planning cycle and planners must appreciate the dynamics of policy formulation before they can design implementation and evaluation procedures effectively.

Policies, however, differ in terms of their scope, complexity, decision environment, range of choices, and decision criteria. This range is schematically depicted in *Figure 1*. Issue-specific policies are short-term decisions involving day-to-day management or, as the term implies, a particular issue. A programme policy is concerned with the design of a programme in a particular area, while a multi-programme policy decision deals with competing programme areas. Finally, strategic decisions deal with large-scale policies and broad resource allocations. For example:

Strategic: How can we provide basic education at a reasonable cost to meet equity and efficiency objectives?

Multi-programme: Should resources be allocated to primary education or to rural training centres?

Programme: How should training centres be designed and provided across the country?

Issue-specific: Should graduates of rural centres be allowed to go into intermediate schools?

Another example:

Strategic: Should we or do we need to introduce diversified education?

Multi-programme: How should we allocate resources between general education, vocational education, and diversified education?

Programme: How and where should we provide diversified education?

Issue-specific: How should practical subjects be taught in diversified schools?

Obviously, the broader the scope of a policy is, the more problematic it becomes. Methodological and political issues become more pronounced such as, definition of the problem in conflictive societies; use of analytical techniques and optimization;

questions of proper theoretical base, measurement, valuation and aggregation; hard objective data vs. soft subjective data; and technical analysis vs. public participation. For a more detailed treatment of this subject, refer to Michael Carley (1980).



Figure 1. Policy scope

Policy making

The term 'policy making' like 'policy' implies competing conceptions and assumptions. A study of the theoretical and empirical work of social scientists reveals the two essential dimensions of policy making: who does it (the actors) and how (the process). Historically, the actor in policy making has been considered unitary and rational; more recently policy analysts have introduced the organizational (public interest) model and the personalistic (self-interest) model. The process element has fluctuated between a synoptic (comprehensive) approach and an incremental approach.

C. Lindblom and D.K. Cohen (1979) laid out the differences between the *synoptic* and *incremental* methods of policy making.

According to him, the synoptic method entails, in its extreme form, one single central planning authority for the whole of society, combining economic, political, and social control into one integrated planning process that makes interaction unnecessary. It assumes: (a) that the problem at hand does not go beyond man's cognitive capacities and (b) there exist agreed criteria (rather than social conflict on values) by which solutions can be judged and (c) that the problem- solvers have adequate incentives to stay with synoptic analysis until it is completed (rather than 'regress' to using incremental planning.)

Incremental policy making, on the other hand, relies on interaction rather than on a complete analysis of the situation to develop a blueprint for solving problems. The incremental approach to policy making is built on the following assumptions: (a) Policy options are based on highly uncertain and fluid knowledge, and are in response to a dynamic situation (everchanging problems, and evolving contexts); (b) No 'correct' solution can therefore be found, or technically derived from a diagnosis of the situation. Thus, no sweeping or drastic reforms should be attempted; (c) Only incremental and limited policy adjustments can be made; and (d) Policy adjustments are expected to remedy an experienced dissatisfaction with past policies, improving the existing situation or relieving an urgent problem. Consequently, these adjustments should be tentative – and in some cases temporary – and must be revised as the dynamics of the situation evolve.

G.T. Allison (1971) developed two alternative models to the commonly assumed model of the unitary rational policymaker: (a) the Organizational process model, and (b) the governmental politics model. The first model assumes a complex government consisting of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Decisions are based on the output of the several entities, functioning independently according to standard patterns of behaviour but partially coordinated by government leaders. The second model carries this concept further. While it also assumes an organizational approach to decision making, the Governmental Politics model plays up the part of individuals in the process. Government decisions are not made by a monolithic state based on rational choice, but rather are

negotiated by various leaders who sit on top of the organizations involved in that particular decision-making process. Each leader is compelled by his own conception of the problem as well as by the imperatives of his organization *and* his own personal goals.

A consolidated model for policy making. Neither of the two dimensions alone (process and actors) fully captures the dynamics of policy making. They need to be combined and restructured into a different configuration, as the topography in *Figure 2* illustrates.



Figure 2. Dimensions of policy making

The actor in policy making is placed on the horizontal-axis – at one end of the spectrum is the societal/personalistic mode, wherein decisions are reached by negotiation among a variety of interest groups (including government ministries, teachers' unions, etc.), driven by their own conception of the problem and individual values. On the other end is the organizational/bureaucratic mode wherein decisions are made within the organizational entity (i.e. the military, the international community, etc.). The process of policy making – from the incremental to the synoptic approach – is placed on the vertical-axis. These two dimensions generate a new topography.

On the one extreme of this new topography (in quadrant I) is the rational model which is a composite of the synoptic method and the organizational/bureaucratic mode. Decision making at this extreme is unitary, rational, centrally controlled, completely technical and value maximizing. On the other extreme (in quadrant III) is a composite of the incremental method and the societal/personalistic mode. Policy making here is a political activity characterized by self-interest, political bargaining, value judgement and multiple rationalities. One can easily argue that most policy making falls somewhere between these two extremes. Analytic techniques carried on in ignorance of political, social and bureaucratic realities do not go very far. Similarly, a pattern of vague and unsystematic political decisions loaded with self-interest, patronage and value judgments can lead to breakdown, if not to chaos.

In sum, a balanced perspective of policy making places analytical rationality within the context of political and institutional aspects of policy making. This is in line with Douglas North's pioneering work on institutional economics that gained him the Nobel Prize in 1993. In addition to modifying the rationality postulate, he extended the economic theory by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the analysis and allotted a fundamental role to institutions for societal change: they are "the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies". (North 1990).

This balanced view of policy making is most appropriate for education. Studies of educational policy making all point to the complexity and multifaceted character of this process due to the nature of both the educational system and the educational change.

One of the more important characteristics of the education system lies in its salient linkages with the socio-economic structure. Any policy changes, therefore, are not purely technical but have socio-political-economic dimensions. For instance, any attempt to modify the system, which is perceived by one group or another as lowering the chances of their children to progress socially or economically, will meet with strong opposition. Therefore, the whole notion of reform for democratization is essentially a political issue. Another complex set of linkages exists between the education system and the economy, whereby the school is seen as the solution to a wide range of economic problems. This belief is the source of much of the impetus for policy changes.

Internally, the educational system is an intricate network of institutions interlocking horizontally and vertically. A policy decision in any one component can have strong repercussions throughout the system. Externally, education seems to be everyone's business and nearly everyone feels qualified to have an opinion about it. Policy making, therefore, involves balancing a number of contradictory demands, and soliciting support, or at least tolerance, from the many different segments of society which have an interest in education.

Conceptual framework for policy analysis

Although decision making is a crucial event in the policy process, clearly it is preceded by analytical and/or political activities (analysis, generation of options, bargaining, etc.) and followed by equally important planning activities (implementation, assessment, and possible redesign). This booklet introduces a framework for education policy analysis that covers the pre-policy decision activities, the decision process itself, and the post-decision planning activities. This framework is not a description of *actual* activities, but rather a conceptual model to extract and specify those elements that can be detected and analyzed. It therefore should be broad enough to capture and *integrate* the intricate process of any policy making model (*Figure 2*), yet at the same time it should *disaggregate* the process into components to determine how they work and interact. The resultant framework, summarized

schematically in *Figure 3* and discussed in detail below, consists of seven policy-planning processes, the first four of which deal with policy making, the fifth with planning and sixth and seventh with policy adjustment:

(i) Analysis of the existing situation.
(ii) The generation of policy options.
(iii) Evaluation of policy options.
(iv) Making the policy decision.
(v) Planning of policy implementation.
(vi) Policy impact assessment.
(vii) Subsequent policy cycles.

This framework looks complicated because, inevitably, it is multifaceted and covers a wide range of processes. However, any attempt to restrict policy analysis to certain elements or to disregard one element results in an incomplete approach to policy analysis, and leads to the historical controversy of the rational vs. the political, or the bureaucratic vs. the organizational approaches in the literature and in public debate. The above seven elements of the framework will be used to frame the case studies in Chapter II and the conclusions in Chapter III.

A. Analysis of the existing situation

A policy change is normally a response to a problem or set of problems in the sector, and must, therefore, start with an appreciation of the educational sector and its context. In addition to the analysis of the sector itself, policy analysis should consider a number of aspects of the social context, including political, economic, demographic, cultural, and social issues which are likely to affect the decision making and even implementation processes of the education sector.

Country background

The general character of a country (location, geography, population, culture, and social stratification patterns) has obvious

implications for education policy analysis. This makes the process of educational policy making more difficult and in a number of ways. Typically different groups have different values about the role of education. Insofar as education represents access to economic and political power, then different access or interest in education also means differential access to power. Resulting conflicts and struggles are particularly acute in countries where the distribution of access to goods and services has become increasingly unequal.

Political context

The preceding observation emphasizes that an analysis of the political environment is necessary for an understanding of the national decision-making process, the comparative value of education, and the role that education must play in the socio-political process. It is worth distinguishing between the priorities of the *national political elite* relative to development and those of the *educational elite* relative to education. It is not only that the head of the ministry of education may have different plans from those of the political elite which appointed him but in many countries there is considerable autonomy provided to the educational sector. It is not at all unusual for the two sets of objectives to be at odds with each other or at least not to be tightly intertwined.

The capacity of the state to do planning at the national level is another critical variable in the institutional analysis of the political sector. Moreover, the professional background of the bureaucrats who do the policy planning and where they have been trained (perhaps in foreign universities) can also affect the ideology of the elite.

Finally, the institutional structure of the political sector has implications for educational development. Many developing countries do not have well developed parties but if they do, their values and preferences need to be calculated as part of the analysis of the political context.



Figure 3. Conceptual framework for policy analysis



Figure 3. (continued)

Economic context

In this area, the analyst wants to understand the present macro-economic situation in general and the human resources situation in particular. It is, however, more important to estimate the likely trends in the various sectors in the future and the financial resources of the country in order to assess what the economy requires from the education sector and what the sector expects to face from the rest of the economy, particularly in terms of general infrastructure and financial resources.

First, variables such as demographic shifts, urbanization, and migration, coupled with the likely growth in various sectors of the economy, will have a significant impact on labour markets and consequently on needs for education and skill training. Second, the level of economic development will set enormous constraints on the capacity of the educational system to build schools and to expand. It is difficult to build schools without the necessary economic infra-structure to say nothing of the presence of firms with the necessary capabilities. The level of economic development also sets the range of possible taxation by the government, which in turn will influence educational expenditures. Third, the economic growth rate is important not only for estimating the likely need for certain kinds of skills but also for estimating the future amounts of slack resources. This is necessary because, as the rate of growth increases, more funds are often made available to education; by the same token, as it decreases, allocations to education are among the first cut.

Education sector

Sector analysis starts with an identification and understanding of the major sectoral issues relevant to the country. These issues may be explored under six categories: (i) access to educational opportunities; (ii) equity in the distribution of educational services; (iii) structure of the education system; (iv) internal efficiency; (v) external efficiency; and (vi) institutional arrangements for the management of the sector. For a full description of these components and the analytic techniques utilized refer to Haddad and

Demsky (1994), Kemmerer (1994), Coombs and Hallak (1987), Mingat and Tan (1988), and Windham (1988a, 1988b).

An analysis of the above issues should take into consideration their *evolutionary* nature: how have issues in the development of the educational system changed over time? The meeting of one educational need or solution of one problem frequently creates another. For example, the expansion of the system and the provision of new facilities naturally lead to issues about the quality of the education provided and the capacity of the educational administration to handle a larger educational system. In addition, the analysis of education across time can sensitize one to the tendency for the system to oscillate between objectives which are somewhat incompatible. A historical and evolutionary perspective on the dynamics of policies across time allows the analyst a better sense of why a particular policy is being advocated at the moment. By studying the past, one also learns the likely speed with which educational policies can be implemented.

Dynamics of change

An assessment of the present situation cannot be complete without evaluating the forces for or against change in the event that policy changes need to be made. Such an assessment has implications for the chances of success of different types of policies and for strategies that must be employed to promote and implement such policies. Nobel laureate North (1994) confesses that "there is no greater challenge facing today's social scientists than the development of a dynamic theory of social change". Meanwhile, he asserts that "individuals and organizations with bargaining power as a result of the institutional framework have a crucial stake in perpetuating the system". One key socio-political factor to analyze, therefore, is the presence and relative strength of interest groups.

In developing countries it is impossible to specify what might be all the relevant interest groups but at minimum one can start with the *providers* of education, most notably, teachers, and the *consumers*, most notably, parents, students and employers. If the former are well organized – they often are – they can be a powerful force in supporting or opposing any educational change. Their

interests are likely to be threatened if the educational change results in some challenge to their status or prerogatives. The consumers can also be powerful, but are generally fragmented. They may be divided into different cultural or occupational, or socioeconomic groups. Frequently, these will have quite different interests in both the quantity and quality of education. Consumer groups most closely connected with either political policy-makers or decision-makers within the education system will be able to exert disproportionate influence. In addition, consumers who can organize themselves into forceful street demonstrations, as have some university students, can effect policy changes very favourable to themselves. Therefore, policy planners need to identify interest groups and assess their openness to reform. For those interest groups identified as anti-reform, planners need to determine how well organized they are, how much power they have in society, and how willing they are to exercise their power.

A separate interest group comprises the officials who administer an education system. Studies suggest that bureaucrats find it in their self-interest to maintain a moderate expansion of the educational system. They tend also to value whatever configuration of education is current and to resist policies that would alter it. Therefore, one important element in policy analysis is to understand what the self-interests of the educational bureaucrats are and to recognize that these are not necessarily identical with those of the teachers, other educational professionals or consumers. Finally, the pressure to see change happen can come from individuals or groups outside the education sector (as in the case of Peru, described in Chapter II) or from external actors, both individual experts and development agencies (as is the case of Burkina Faso).

B. The process of generating policy options

New policies are usually generated when the present situation of the sector and its context is perturbed by a problem, a political decision or a reorganization scheme (overall national planning). Policy options can be generated in several different ways to accommodate the disequilibrium. For analytical purposes one can group these processes under the following four modes: systemic,

incremental, *ad hoc* and importation. In concrete situations, though, several of these modes may be combined.

The systemic mode

The title may suggest that this is the preferred or best method for generating policy options. This is not necessarily the case because under certain conditions this mode may prove to be defective or impractical. The systemic mode is characterized by three operations: generation of data, formulation and prioritization of options, and refining options. Data are usually derived from two sources: sector analysis, and the existing body of professional knowledge (conventional wisdom, research synthesis, comparative indicators, etc.).

Formation of options under this mode is a fairly complicated process of induction. If based on data alone, a large number of options can be generated to fit the different 'givens' of the sector and its context. At its extreme, intellectual induction seeks to anticipate all possible policy outcomes by thinking through all possible contingencies. It then proceeds to identify optimal or at least efficient options. However, a variety of intellectual, political, social and professional constraints limit the range of policy options. Moreover, options may be given different weights and priorities depending on the perceived importance of the sectoral issues, the relative strength of the interest groups, and the possible combination of different options.

Some of the policy options may be subjected to a microcycle of problem identification: policy formulation – verification – modification or retention. This is a blend of induction and sequential interaction. The experimentation or *pilot studies* approach adds an input into the data base and to the 'weighting' of the policy options.

The incremental mode

Once a problem within the educational system is recognized, then a solution is frequently forced upon the system. This is especially likely to occur when there is a public debate about a problem. Given widespread interest and discussion, the educational

system is forced to do something to maintain its legitimacy. The sense of urgency necessitates a quick response. Since the problem is likely to be located in one particular segment of the system, then the issue is how to formulate a policy to adapt the system to the response. This is sometimes called the 'acting out' approach whereby the policymaker seeks to adjust present difficulties rather than to anticipate future ones, thereby promoting incremental improvements.

The ad hoc mode

Sometimes the problem is outside the educational system. It may not even be a problem but instead the emergence of a new elite or a major political event which requires that the educational system make some adjustments or changes. Here the policy may have no rational basis within the education sector.

The importation mode

There are many innovations and fashions in educational systems around the world. These can be the source of the policy options considered. Foreign specialists, operating as consultants for international agencies, can provide the stimulus for this mode. However, a certain policy adopted elsewhere can be imported successfully only if it meets the needs of particular groups in the society, i.e. if there is an importer.

C. *Evaluation of policy options*

Policy options can be evaluated only if alternative scenarios are developed to allow estimations of the likely implications of the options considered. The 'imaginary' situation that would be created if a policy option were implemented is compared with the present situation, and the scenario of transition from the existing to the imaginary case is evaluated in terms of desirability, affordability, and feasibility.

Desirability

This involves three dimensions: (1) The impact of the option on the various interest groups or stakeholders: who would benefit? who might feel threatened? how might the potential losers be compensated? what would make the option desirable to all stakeholders? (2) compatibility with the dominant ideology and targets of economic growth articulated in national development plans; and (3) in some cases, the impact of a policy option on political development and the stability.

Affordability

The fiscal costs of the change as well as the social and political costs need to be evaluated. The difficulty of making these estimations lies in the ability to predict future trends, including economic growth. This is especially important because educational expenditures are more vulnerable to changes in economic situations and political objectives than some other kinds of public expenditure. Therefore, alternative economic scenarios need to be considered. Further, private costs (will a reform require consumers to share the costs, and if so what happens to the poorer groups?), opportunity costs (are there other measures which might benefit the education system, but would have to be foregone to pay for the current proposal?) and political costs (if an option favours one group over another, is the government willing to pay the political cost?) should also be weighed..

Feasibility

Another and very different kind of implication is the availability of human resources for implementing the change. Fiscal resources are easy to compute. More difficult is the estimate of what level of training is required of teachers (the more sophisticated the programme and/or technology involved, the more highly trained the personnel need to be) and whether there are enough personnel to implement the policy option. In many developing countries, highly trained personnel may be in short supply. This then raises the

question of whether they can be imported or trained and at what cost. Equally important is the presence of the institutional culture (norms, procedures, environment) necessary to attract, retain, and effectively utilize trained personnel in transforming policies into plans and implemented programmes. Another element in the calculus of feasibility is time. Most studies of education projects indicate that there are frequent time overruns in implementation. More realistic estimates of time need to be made and can only be done by the careful assessment of the implementation capabilities and experiences.

The issue of sustainability should fare prominently when the above criteria are applied. Education initiatives have to be sustained politically and financially over a lengthy period of time to reach fruition. To ensure that, the *long-term* implications of policy options should be weighed within an overall sectoral policy, itself embedded in a prudent macro framework, and consistent with long-term national aspirations.

D. Making the policy decision

Rarely would a policy decision be the considered consequence of the evaluation and previous stages of the decision process – the culmination of a process during which all information relevant to the decision was gathered and carefully analyzed so that a totally optimal policy might be designed and selected. The variety of conflicting interests and rationalities requires that the policy which is selected engineers 'trade-offs' among these interests. The resulting policy may not be optimal for any single interest group, but such a bargained result is necessary to have the broad base of political support which will be needed to take the policy from the drawing board to implementation. In addition, political pressures, oversights in evaluation, or the simple pressure of time may short-circuit the process. A minister with a 'pet idea', for instance, may decide to move directly from his view of the current situation to policy decision, short-cutting the three stages of the process described above. Thus, to assess the soundness of the decision process up to this stage, it is useful to ask questions such as the following:

(1) How was the decision made – did it go through all the stages of policy analysis?
(2) How radical a departure is the decision from current policy?
(3) How consistent is this decision with policies of other sectors?
(4) Is the policy diffusely articulated or is it stated in a manner which is easily measurable?
(5) Does the policy seem operational or is its implementation implausible?

E. Planning policy implementation

Once a policy has been chosen, planning for policy implementation should begin immediately. Although much of the work that must be carried out during this stage can be based on evaluations performed to make the policy decision, planning for implementation involves a concreteness absent in earlier stages of the policy process.

What was abstract during the evaluation stage begins to become concrete during planning. A *schedule* for moving people, physical objects and funds must be drawn up with a clarity and attention to detail that leaves no doubt as to who will do what, when and how; *physical resources*, once the content of hypothetical lists, must be located and their availability assured; *financial resources*, once ear-marked for possible use, must be appropriated so that implementation delays are minimal; the *personnel* needed to put plans into action must be freed from other commitments and made ready to go to work; the *technical knowledge* needed to guide the policy implementation must be mastered by those who will employ it; and the *administrative systems* within which the policy will be directed must be clearly structured and firmly in place.

Ambitious as these tasks are, there is one planning task that is more difficult (and it is the most often over-looked). This is the task of *mobilizing political support*. The mobilization of political support resonates most clearly when one thinks of the need to ensure that the providers and consumers of a new educational initiative embrace it with enthusiasm. Plans must be developed so

that students and their families are aware of the objectives of a new initiative, that communities learn of benefits for the collectivity; programmes for teachers, educational administrators and their representatives must similarly be developed. Since new initiatives usually mean some form of job re-definition, it is important that educators see this as beneficial and that those who object to the changes be isolated. Political mobilization may also be necessary to ensure that materials for school construction are available when needed, that needed institutional administrative adjustments are carried out, and, especially, that funding proposals are approved. One important strategy for mobilizing political support is that of involving groups affected by the new initiative in the planning process. This will pay dividends not only in the form of enhanced support, but, more likely, in terms of an improved policy design.

A significant amount of planning and even *de facto* policy formulation take place during actual implementation. This is the case because, during implementation, the following is the rule rather than the exception:

(a) circumstances related to implementation constraints cause policy modifications to take place;

(b) feedback obtained during implementation causes reassessment of aspects of the policy decision and subsequent modifications by policymakers; and

(c) the mere translation of abstract policy intentions into concrete implementation causes re-assessment and re-design. These changes occur with great frequency because, unfortunately, implementation problems are often greatly under-estimated during the stage of policy planning.

Misjudging ease of implementation is, perhaps, the most frequent error in policy planning. No matter how deeply the various groups affected by a new initiative have been involved in reviewing and shaping plans, the concreteness of the first day of a new programme, often casts it in a new light. Implementation is the time when one discovers that schedules are unrealistic and that programmes are over-ambitious; it is the time when the ravages of inflation cause the teachers' union to demand a pay increase prior to using the new texts; it is the time when parents conclude that the

certification offered by the new programme may not guarantee their children the jobs they hoped for; and it is the time when local politicians decide that they should block the initiative since it will be so successful that it will prove that the politicians in the capital are better providers than they. Such problems are often replays of issues raised during the stages of evaluating policy options or of planning, and need to be solved by taking a flexible approach to the stage of policy implementation.

No matter how well anticipated, policy implementation always brings some surprises. These shape the policy output, sometimes in crucial ways. One way to use such surprises to improve policy outcomes is to design the implementation in stages. If unanticipated problems arise at a given stage, then a re-evaluation of the plans for implementation, and possibly of the policy decision itself, is in order. Another way is to conduct well designed *pilot studies*, before full implementation of any projects. Problems of going to scale and the dangers of the 'greenhouse' projects that cannot survive implantation in the real world are well treated in Kemmerer (1990).

F. Policy impact assessment

Once the policy has been in place long enough to produce results, a policy assessment check can take place. To carry this out, it is necessary to have some sense of how long it should take for the policy, once implemented, to take hold. While policy output measurement can be carried out on a continual basis, premature attempts at assessment can mis-state the effectiveness of the policy. Furthermore, it is preferable to delay final assessment until a number of teaching cycles have transpired to separate the effect of the content of the policy change from the excitement which often accompanies implementing a new initiative for the first time. On the other hand, the sooner accurate assessment takes place, the sooner policy-makers can know if their initiatives are working as anticipated or if adjustments in policy design or policy implementation are required.

If assessment reveals that the policy outcome is lacking, it is necessary to determine whether the policy itself is inadequate, or

whether poor implementation is at fault. Human capital inadequacies, under-funding, or inadequate economic stimulus during the implementation stage are among the many possible causes of failure of a well designed policy. On the other hand, if assessment reveals deficiencies in outcomes and if implementation can be shown to have been well done, then it is necessary to re-examine the policy decision and to determine what adjustments or what new policies should be substituted for the original choice. Once this is accomplished, then one moves again to the planning and implementation stages. Given the rapid pace of contemporary change and the intimate links between the educational system and the rest of society, even successfully conceived and implemented initiatives require adjustments over time.

Policy impact assessment is carried out using the same criteria employed during the policy evaluation stage. The assessment process revolves around the following questions: What have been the actual *impacts* of the policies in question? Are these impacts *desirable* given the changes that were hoped for? Are the changes *affordable*? Did costs prevent their full implementation? Did cost over-runs make it unthinkable to implement them over a longer term or on a wider basis? Can the policy be lived with politically and socially? Are the impacts *feasible*? Were full impacts accomplished? Would exceptional efforts be required to replicate these impacts in other circumstances?

G. *Subsequent policy cycles*

If a policy initiative is carried out systematically, the process of policy design, planning, implementation, impact assessment, and re-design will become iterative, and, in theory, infinitely so, as *Figure 3* suggests. Unfortunately, long-term policy analysis and planning is not often carried out in such a fashion. Often the results of verification are not ploughed back into policy. Instead, verification is often seen as a stock-taking exercise, needed in order to close the books on a policy initiative. Later in the country's history, when policy change is once again needed in the educational area under discussion, a policy process often begins *de novo* and may duplicate much of the analysis, derivation of alternative

options, evaluation, and planning carried out earlier. The conclusion, then, of policy analysis is never to conclude. Ideally, once implementation has been completed and policy outcomes are forthcoming, a policy impact assessment stage ensues, leading potentially to a new policy cycle.

Chapter II. Application of policy analysis in educational planning activities: four exemplary cases

The above conceptual framework (*Chapter I* and *Figure 3*) is applied in this Chapter to four exemplary case studies to reconstruct the dimensions of policy-making and planning (processes and actors) over time. Certain specific educational reforms in Peru, Jordan, Thailand and Burkina Faso were selected because sufficient data (and elapsed time) exist on each to allow discussion of the full policy cycle (or cycles in some cases); also, the geographical, economic, pedagogical, and political diversity of the cases emphasizes that the policy framework is generic and not limited in applicability by any of these factors.

Each case study documents the process of policy making and recreates a real situation. It tries to represent as accurately as possible the factual background and setting of the event(s) in question, identify the key issues and players, present the information and actions leading to a policy decision, and document the events that took place during implementation. Moreover, case studies simulate the dynamics of decision-making, which include the process of asking questions, evaluating data, assessing what kinds of policy actions are practicable, negotiating, competing between interest groups, and trading off between different constraints and benefits.

In all cases, the following questions were posed:

- Were the educational issues diagnosed and analyzed within the appropriate socio-economic and political context?
- Were all policy options to deal with these issues identified?
- Were the implications of such options properly derived?

- Were these implications fully evaluated in terms of their desirability, affordability, and implementability?
- Was implementation of policy well planned and executed to allow for feedback and modifications?
- Was the impact of the policy properly assessed in order to determine whether to continue the policy, modify it, or go on to a new policy cycle?
- Were the countries' responses to assessment of the policy cycle appropriate?
- How were subsequent policy cycles similar to, or different from the initial policy-making cycle?

To answer these questions the policy *process* was analyzed, step by step, examining events within the context of the conceptual framework and the elements laid out in Chapter I. The basis for the analysis was an extensive review of World Bank and other relevant reports of international and bilateral agencies, government documents, and research papers. Understandably, the scope of the information, analysis and conclusions are constrained by the availability, scope and nature of the data base. In order to make up for these constraints, interviews were conducted whenever feasible with participants in, or close observers of, some phases of the policy process. Below are concise summaries of each case; detailed analyses are in Haddad and Demsky (1994).

I. Peru: a case of comprehensive/revolutionary approach

Peru provides a case where a government undertook policy reform in the synoptic, comprehensive model. The reform embraced the entire education system, from primary school all the way through to the university. It aimed at integrating practical and academic subjects in ways that would provide the country with the intellectual power and the complete range of skills to achieve sustained economic and social development. It aimed equally at resolving issues of equity and external efficiency. This policy was well calculated and comprehensive, and was developed through a systematic process of diagnosis, response and action within a

carefully planned programme. The reform, however, was considered a failure.

The context of policy formulation (Situation A)

Frustrated for more than a decade with the seeming inefficiency of civilian governments, in 1968, a group of military officers, led by Velasco, had overthrown the democratically elected government of Fernando Belaunde Terry. The Peru which had frustrated the officers was a country of deep income inequality, massive rural-urban migration, exploding birth rates, poor health care, desperate unemployment, rampant inflation, and a failing educational system.

The educational system was also chaotic and politicized. The teachers' union had long been the most militant and best organized national labour organization. Provision of education was inadequate by any measure: across social classes it was more unequally distributed than income; most graduates were trained for non-existent white collar jobs, and few gained technical skills; enrolment and retention rates were alarmingly low; and many areas of the country lacked any kind of educational facility.

What was the potential for change? The military regime had the ability to 'force' a reform and a newly bolstered economy could support it. However, interest groups, teachers, ministries and parents, while unanimously favouring reforms, had their own ideas to advocate. Moreover, the Ministry of Education, the obvious implementor of policy change, was considered ill-equipped to carry out an educational reform as well as a potential obstacle to change.

The generation of policy options

Due to the revolutionary nature of decision making, the real options were about which objectives were best suited to revolutionary goals, what educational policies should be adopted, and how best to effect these policies. Policy options were conceived by a group of military advisors within a carefully planned and revolutionary programme of action for reforming the whole national structure known as the 'Inca Plan.' Because the 1968 promise of

an overall educational reform had met with widespread scepticism, the government established a civilian Educational Reform Commission. Its report, *Reform of Peruvian Education General Report*, in 1970, epitomized the revolutionary style of generating policy options through rational deduction: diagnosis, response, action.

The Commission, after diagnosing the education system as inequitable, inefficient, outmoded and rigid, and lacking a Peruvian spirit, considered that the response could not be less than an education that aimed to create 'the new Peruvian man in a new Peruvian society.' The only logical option to meet this objective and address all the defects simultaneously was a thorough restructuring of the system to provide universal diversified secondary schooling (ESEPs) to all. This option was consistent with an emerging educational policy in the international community.

Evaluation of policy options

The policy objectives and elements of the entire reform were evaluated at three separate points: (1) when the military seized power with the promise of 'revolutionary' egalitarian reform; (2) under the Education Reform Commission; and (3) during a two-year public review process. At each stage, implications were drawn, although not systematically, for the impact the proposed policy would have on *Situation A*, *Figure 3*.

The *desirability* of the reform was driven by the military's ideological perspective that the reform was the key to the realization of their goals of 'the liberation of man' and 'the creation of a new society' based on Christian humanist values and equitable treatment of all citizens. *Affordability* was assumed by the *General Report* which suggested that the reform would be self-financing. The Ministry of Finance undertook a more serious study of affordability, but assumptions regarding revenue to finance the reform continued to be hazy. Likewise, the *feasibility* of the reform was inadequately evaluated: a full analysis of how to provide the necessary human resources was never conducted, and though a schedule had been established, no one took it seriously.

Other groups affected by the proposed policy did not see it as desirable. University officials and students regarded it as a threat to their power. The poor and uneducated were also, at best, ambivalent to it. The military, however, thought that any such reluctance to embrace the reform would evaporate once it was well understood. For two full years, therefore, the reform document was widely discussed publicly and privately with all interested groups. Further, a cadre of young men and women were sent to different parts of the country to sensitize and mobilize the public.

Making the policy decision

In 1972, the military announced sweeping reform, covering all levels and types of education, calling for the participation of the community in the education process, the reorganization of the country's education bureaucracy, and the establishment of a curriculum related to Peru's development requirements. More specifically: *Centros de Educacion Basica* (CEBs) were to combine the previous primary and secondary education cycles and reduce them from 11 years to nine; the last two or three years of basic education were to focus on vocational or practical skills training; basic education will be followed by *Escuelas Superiores de Educacion Profesional* (ESEPs), or higher schools of professional education that combine obligatory academic and practical elements in a three-year programme and are open to all graduates of basic education. ESEPs would be the only form of public secondary education in Peru, and graduation from them would be a requirement for admission to universities.

The new strategic policy was largely based on the 1970 *General Report*, though it also incorporated modifications suggested by vociferous interest groups during the two-year review period. Essentially, these alterations were devised to avoid rejection or opposition, rather than as part of a systematic policy design effort. Chief characteristics of the decision include: (1) it was reached through a 'synoptic' approach; the President's Advisory Committee and later the Educational Reform Commission had conducted a prolonged and extensive study of the entire system and presented a diagnosis of its problems, logical responses, and policy action to

be taken; (2) it was a radical departure from the existing situation A, requiring a proportionate reformation of the institutional infrastructure (expected to take 15-20 years); and (3) it was consistent with other sectoral reforms in that they were fashioned around one overall development plan.

Planning policy implementation

Plans were drawn for a three-phase implementation schedule. They included: institutional and administrative changes and mobilization of financial, human, physical, technical, and political resources. The World Bank and other entities, including UNESCO, USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the government of Hungary, all played instrumental roles, promising to provide funding and technical assistance for the reform, especially the diversified secondary school element.

As implementation proceeded, the 1972 policy was continually and profoundly modified, due to the low administrative capacity of the Peruvian government, inadequate human resources, and rising domestic dissatisfaction with the military government (reflected in lack of support for the reform) and lack of financial resources. Schedules and time lines were severely modified, and in the end, the objective of immediate overall reform was discarded in favour of setting up an experimental group of ESEPs (as well as basic education centres).

Policy impact assessment

The impact of the educational reform (which resulted in *Situation B* as shown in *Figure 3*) was never formally evaluated against the expected consequences envisioned in 1972. If it had been, the results would have been largely negative. Politically, the reform, and especially the ESEPs, had been associated with the increasingly unpopular military regime and widely resisted. With very limited implementation, most students were opting not to enrol in the ESEPs and other reformed schools (enrolment in the eleven pilot ESEPs was less than 50 per cent of the available places). Not only did they consider that the new schools would not provide them

with social mobility, but their views were supported by university refusal to grant admission to ESEP graduates. Further, the quality of teachers in poorer rural (and especially indigenous Quechua-speaking) areas was below that of urban schools. In addition, ESEP training did not promise to match Peru's labour market needs. Finally, economically the ESEPs proved to be considerably more expensive to operate than the traditional schools. In sum, though not explicitly evaluated against these criteria, the reform was implicitly found to be undesirable, unaffordable and infeasible.

The new policy cycle

The newly re-elected Belaunde government (which ousted the military government in 1980 elections) entered into a new policy cycle, but skipped directly to the policy decision stage. Despite the lack of formal assessment of the reform and the lack of any attempt to generate and evaluate alternative policy options, almost immediately upon assuming office Belaunde decided to abandon through neglect the 1972 reform, and to reinstate the traditional education system of his earlier civilian government. Belaunde's choice of neglect rather than immediate overt rejection was based on relative feasibility – there just seemed to be no need to confront those interest groups which still supported the reform when the same results could be had through a less active approach. Implementation seemed easy operationally, because few ESEPs and other reformed schools had yet been established. In the end, a Comprehensive Education Law was passed in 1983 which abolished the concept of a nine-year basic education followed by the ESEP, and reinstated the six-year primary school followed by a five-year secondary school divided into a general two-year cycle and a diversified three-year cycle. The ESEPs became Higher Technical Institutes.

II. Jordan: a case of going from the incremental to the comprehensive

In the early 1970s, the government of Jordan introduced an educational policy of secondary school diversification to resolve

issues of manpower supply and employment. Fifteen years later, prompted by a deteriorating economic situation, the government undertook another reform that included the expansion of diversified education, but with substantial curricular changes. These aimed to increase the attractiveness of diversification to consumers and its relevance to changing domestic and international economic demands. Whereas Peru, reforming education during the same period, had used the synoptic approach, Jordan initially adopted the incremental path.

The context of policy formulation (Situation A)

Though the late 1950s and early 1960s had been a time of rapid economic growth for Jordan, this was disrupted by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war which resulted in Jordan's loss of the West Bank – its best agricultural land and main source of tourism, a massive migration of over one-quarter million Palestinians to the East Bank. A recovery of the economy was prevented in 1970 and 1971 by a Jordanian-Palestinian struggle for control of the country.

The Jordan of the early 1970s was a country in transition. A shortage of skilled workers was coupled simultaneously with a surplus of unskilled workers and academically-educated youth. The education system was thus considered dysfunctional. Only 10 per cent of secondary school students were in commercial and industrial schools that were few in number and lacked equipment and adequate curricula, and academic education and white collar employment were highly valued.

Structurally, the education system had the potential for change without major obstacles. The highly centralized political power structure (and education system) could provide the necessary support for any policy decision. However, various elements of the Jordanian society had their own notions of what changes would be in their interests and consistent with their values. The financial resources of the country could also place constraints on educational change.

The generation of policy options

Options for policy change were generated on the basis of limited data and analysis. The government commissioned several studies to explore the manpower situation and its education and training implications, which provided an idea of the relative shortages of sub-professionals and technicians and surpluses of general secondary school leavers. Meanwhile, after conducting their own sector work and analysis, the World Bank and UNESCO faulted the over-theoretical nature of a general education and placed value on offering practical and occupational subjects at the secondary level.

To address the country's manpower needs noted above, the government considered four policy options for educational development: (I) continuing the existing system of general secondary schools predominated with vocational schools; (II) increasing the number of vocational schools and reducing the number of general academic schools; (III) modifying the system through introducing pre-vocational subjects at the preparatory school level, introducing a new type of post-preparatory vocational institution (the trade training centre) and introducing diversified education (combining academic and vocational courses in one institutional setting) at the secondary level and (IV) introducing a major structural overhaul of the system, transforming schools into practice facilities where learners of different age groups would work on real-life situations and in the process contribute to economic development in the country.

Evaluation of policy options

The policy options were evaluated in a fragmented and informal way. *Option I* was evaluated and rejected in terms of desirability and affordability. The government felt a need to change the existing system and cost projections showed that maintaining the system would be financially unaffordable. *Option II* was considered and rejected mainly in terms of affordability and desirability. Vocational schools were costly and had low status and small establishments preferred trainable – not fully trained – candidates.

Option IV, advanced by UNESCO, was rejected on the grounds that it was not feasible. Jordanian authorities were not prepared to undertake such a comprehensive approach (or synoptic, as defined in Chapter I) calling for a full reorientation of the system that would require an enormous investment in terms of time, funding and personnel. *Option III* was evaluated on the basis of affordability, desirability and feasibility, although a full range of implications for *Situation A* in *Figure 3* was never derived. The World Bank was largely responsible for evaluating the cost factor shown to be within government resources (with a Bank loan to finance the capital expenditure). Jordanian officials found this option desirable because comprehensive schooling was touted by the international community (particularly the World Bank) to increase the prestige of a vocational education by its association with academic education. Further, it would provide a flexible basis for meeting the needs of sectors of the economy whose pattern of development and specific skill requirements could not be forecast in advance. Despite that, it was to be introduced as a pilot programme. The incremental (and therefore low-risk) nature of the policy meant that the demand for such a reform was never addressed. As noted earlier, parents and students considered academic education as a means for further education and upward mobility; the fact that this was not considered would pose problems when the policy was later adopted.

Making the policy decision

The government policy to introduce comprehensive education was multi-programme (earlier described in Chapter I), addressing the question of how to allocate resources between general education, vocational education, and diversified education. The decision provided for continuous expansion of a nine-year basic education; introduction of the concept of comprehensive education; and reorientation of vocational and technical streams to strengthen industrial programmes, and development of new specializations and methods of training.

This decision was chosen largely at the urging of the World Bank and, to a certain extent, upon the advice of UNESCO,

supplemented by its own evaluation. Of critical importance to the decision was the incremental approach to this policy – education authorities were content to introduce the policy on a pilot basis.

Planning policy implementation

Since this was to be an incremental approach to policy change, long-run plans for the implementation were made in broad terms, leaving the detailed implementation plans for specific projects. As implementation progressed, there was concern over the division between academic and vocational education in the project schools. Consequently, the social and pedagogical integration expected from comprehensive schools did not take place. Finally, in keeping with the step-by-step approach to policy-making, education authorities decided to pilot another type of vocational institution, the general vocational secondary school. These were to provide two or more vocational courses (for example, industry and commerce) in one institution, and were targeted for thinly populated areas which otherwise would not have access to vocational schooling.

Policy impact assessment

The impact of the diversification policy was not formally and systematically evaluated. However, it was scrutinized within the context of a movement to reform the entire education system in the mid-1980s dictated by *Situation B* (*Figure 3*), characterized by (a) changes in the economic situation, and (b) performance of the comprehensive schools.

To begin with, the state of the economy, which had greatly improved during the regional boom of the mid-1970s through the early 1980s began to turn around. The economic slow down in the Gulf states resulted in a decline in demand for Jordanian exports, and the unemployment problem began to re-emerge, as displaced Jordanians returned home. Further, projections for 1990 by the World Bank continued to anticipate a net surplus of workers, concentrated in white-collar pursuits.

Performance of the comprehensive schools was considered mixed. Between 1980 and 1987, the percentage of secondary

students enrolled in vocational courses increased from 19 per cent to 29 per cent. However, students and parents continued to look down upon a vocational education for three reasons: (i) because of the low prestige accorded to blue-collar jobs; (ii) because the vocational streams in comprehensive schools offered a curriculum that was inferior to the academic curriculum; and (iii) because the vocational courses were terminal and therefore did not provide the opportunity for further education and upward mobility. For these reasons, the government concluded that comprehensive schools, as they existed, were not adequate to deal with the new economic situation, and therefore a change in policy was necessary.

The new policy cycle

The state of the economy in 1985 provided a great deal of incentive to bring about change that did not exist in the boom times of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when reform measures were initially discussed. In 1985, King Hussein appointed a reform committee, the National Commission to Assess Educational Policies and appointed his brother, the Crown Prince, to its head. The Commission set up a Central Task Force, appointed field committees to collect data, and organized a series of workshops and seminars to examine the education system. This process facilitated the input into the policy of a broad base of the population.

In generating policy options, the Commission looked closely at the existing situation (*Situation B*). It considered the importance of human capital 'exports', and the government's intentions to change the national economic structure in favour of the commodity producing sectors in order to increase their contribution to GDP. Therefore, the Commission sought to develop a strategic policy (see Chapter I) that would utilize human capital for both reviving domestic growth and assisting in maintaining external balances through continued 'exportation' of human capital. The policy options open to the Commission included: (I) maintaining the status quo, offering communities the choice of academic high schools, vocational high schools, comprehensive high schools, general vocational secondary schools (GVSSs), and trade training centres; (II) placing even greater emphasis on vocational education,

increasing the number of vocational schools, GVSSs, and vocational tracks in comprehensive schools while decreasing the number of academic schools; (III) introducing incremental reform as in the past, in the form of modification of the vocational curriculum, introduction of more practical applications, etc.; and (IV) introducing major reforms including restructuring the system; reforming the examination process; creating different streams in comprehensive schools; and introducing pre-vocational courses at the preparatory level and strengthening in the curricula for all other levels.

All four options were never fully and comparatively evaluated. The Commission was predisposed to more radical change due in large part to the prevailing economic problems and the unresponsiveness of the curriculum. Therefore, Options I, II, and III were not seriously pursued. Option IV, however, was evaluated fully. Governmental authorities determined that it would be *implementable* because there was a political will to see it happen. It would be *affordable* because the government would stand behind it with financial resources and would seek a World Bank loan. The World Bank also examined the affordability of the reform and determined that it would rest on two factors: the expansion of external assistance flows, and implementation of cost recovery and cost saving measures. Contingency plans were also developed in the event of a funding shortfall. Finally, it would be *desirable* to students and parents; it would provide all students a stronger grounding in basic knowledge and skills through expansion of the basic schooling cycle, and would also provide vocational students a better chance of progressing to post-secondary schooling by strengthening the core curriculum.

There was some institutional opposition as was true in 1980, but this major reform was passed in 1987 due to a sense of urgency created by the economic environment, and a political will to see it happen. Though the Ministry of Education was entrusted with formulating an implementation plan, in order to circumvent bureaucratic resistance to the reform, an independent body, the National Centre for Education Research and Development was established, which has so far succeeded in overseeing implementation.

III. Thailand: a case of going from the specific to the strategic

Around 1966, the government of Thailand introduced a scheme to pilot a new policy for secondary school diversification. The aim was to resolve a specific issue: a perceived mismatch between general secondary education and the needs of a swiftly changing labour market. Initially, the policy was limited to that one issue and a few schools. About 10 years later, it was expanded on two levels; geographically, to cover the nation, and politically, to resolve strategic issues of equity, democratization and national unity. The broadened policy has since been well received and implemented, and has been relatively successful in meeting its main objectives.

First Policy Cycle

The context of policy formulation

Thailand, in 1966, was a constitutional monarchy with a fairly stable military government. It is predominantly rural and multi-ethnic, which presented something of a security problem, particularly in the Northeast, exacerbated by security concerns in neighbouring countries.

The Thai economy, particularly the industrial sector, grew rapidly in the 1960s, but concentrated in the urban areas. The unemployment rate in the mid-1960s was only about one percent, but the government believed that manpower shortages had constrained economic growth. Further, manpower projections forecast a shortage of middle and high level technical personnel while they expected increasing unemployment among those educated in the liberal arts and humanities.

Thailand's educational system was elitist and highly academic. Compulsory education was being expanded from four to seven years, but secondary education had major problems: (1) access to educational resources – the focus on basic education was at the expense of secondary education; (2) urban/rural equity; (3) internal efficiency; and (4) external efficiency – the secondary curriculum

was highly academic and focused on advancing students to the next level while the developing Thai economy needed an increasing supply of skilled workers. Further, vocational secondary schools did not appear to prepare students for the labour market, according to some indicative data.

What was the potential for change? The highly-centralized nature of the system would make it more conducive to change, though the country had a weak administrative base. However, parents and students could prove to be a barrier. Culturally, the society prized knowledge as an end in itself, rather than as a vocational tool. At the same time, Thai businesses did not value vocational school graduates. Further, teachers and school administrators preferred the status quo. On the positive side, funding for reform was available.

The generation of policy options

The Thai authorities wished to modernize the education system to remedy the above problems. Analysis of the situation came from several fronts. First, the government of Thailand with the United States Operations Missions (USOM) formed a Task Force that conducted a number of studies that focused on the need for middle-level manpower. Also, the Department of Secondary Education undertook its own study which advocated introducing comprehensive education on a larger scale. At about the same time, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) undertook an examination of the sector which supported the findings of these studies.

Given the government's concern, then, for future manpower requirements, it considered the following policy options for secondary education: (I) continuance of the existing system of college-preparatory and vocational streaming; (II) reducing the relative importance of college-preparatory secondary education while greatly increasing vocational secondary schools; and (III) increasing the role of vocational secondary schools *and* introducing comprehensive secondary schools.

Evaluation of policy options

Policy options were examined in an *ad hoc* manner. Both the Ministry of Education and CIDA conducted their own evaluations. Option I was considered undesirable – the existing system was not adequately meeting the existing and projected manpower needs of the changing Thai economy. Option II was also considered undesirable: vocational education was held in low esteem and did not properly prepare graduates for the workforce. Option III was evaluated in terms of desirability, feasibility and affordability. It was considered desirable because an earlier pilot programme in two schools had shown promising results and because it would provide an education better suited to local conditions and thereby make some impact on rural development. In addition, the prevailing international educational ideology supported such an approach over a dysfunctional academic model. This option would be implementable because it could draw upon the experience of the earlier schools. Finally, it would be more affordable than greatly increasing the places in vocational schools. CIDA and USAID strongly supported this option, as did a select group of Ministry of Education authorities and educational experts.

Making the policy decision

The Thai government chose policy option III to address future manpower needs and to change the *aspirations* of secondary school graduates. It can therefore be considered 'issue-oriented' as described in Chapter I. Essentially, the decision was to introduce a strong 'practical' curriculum to the existing college-preparatory and vocational curricula, which would train large numbers of secondary graduates in mathematics, science and applied areas, who would be trainable on the job for many different kinds of positions in trades, sales, skilled and semi-skilled labour, commerce and minor executive and supervisory positions. The programme would be flexible, and students would be free to select their own courses.

There were three important characteristics to this decision. First, government authorities had a *laissez-faire* attitude about the policy; they accepted the Canadian position though the latter had a

different reason for advocating diversified schooling. Second, though the policy was a radical change from the existing system, it was a pilot programme and would be implemented on a very limited basis. As such, it faced no opposition because it did not pose an immediate threat to any major interest groups. Finally, the donor community strongly promoted the policy: CIDA to prepare people for the demands of modern nationhood, and USAID to ensure the political security of the provincial areas.

Planning policy implementation

Planning for implementation was quite extensive, aided by a CIDA technical assistance project and a USAID 'companion' project in support of the diversification policy. Education authorities and project donor agencies closely managed implementation of the policy, and made several important modifications as the need arose. Architectural, procurement, and maintenance procedures were developed to reduce costs and make them more efficient. Course offerings were consolidated, and practical subjects were added to the curriculum of the upper secondary schools in the CIDA project.

Policy impact assessment

The following events in *Situation B* (*Figure 3*) in the early 1970s provided an impetus for evaluation of the policy: The political situation had changed dramatically – student demonstrations brought down the military government and the ranks of the insurgency continued to grow. The economy had slowed substantially, leading to economic problems in the rural areas, and large income disparities and urban and educated unemployment. In general secondary education, concerns continued to be expressed regarding internal and external efficiency.

The piloted programme of diversified schooling was considered a success in terms of desirability: enrolments were over target (partly due to an aggressive recruitment drive), the level of academic work was high and the schools appeared to be influencing students to choose vocational education at the upper secondary

level. Further, there was considerable community support. However, on counts of feasibility and affordability the picture was not as bright. The system was unable to train sufficient instructors to teach practical subjects, or provide an adequate supply of curriculum guides and textbooks. Also, the schools were expensive to construct and operate.

Second Policy Cycle

Policy response: generating policy options

Though some experts and educators began meeting in 1971 to discuss possible changes, the coup in 1973 gave impetus to a reform movement. This led to the creation of a special committee of prominent and highly respected intellectuals and bureaucrats in 1974 charged with laying the groundwork for systematic and system-wide reform. The reform committee commissioned its own studies, and also drew upon studies completed by UNESCO (highlighting the wide disparities of economic growth rates between the rural and urban areas, implicating the low educational level of farmers and other rural workers) and the World Bank. The Committee viewed reform of secondary education as driven by the following objectives: (1) to address the demand for secondary education in the rural areas in order to stem insurgency; (2) to improve the quality of instruction, and (3) to provide the type of education that would prepare students for work. The policy options proposed included: (I) Focusing on traditional secondary education while improving equity, external efficiency, and quality; (II) Continuing to implement diversified education in a limited way, but maintaining traditional secondary education as the prominent mode; and (III) Expanding diversified schooling, making it the prominent mode.

Evaluation of policy options

The policy options were not systematically evaluated. At the outset, the reform committee felt that meeting the above objectives required a 'strategic' policy (as described in Chapter I) as compared

to one that was 'issue-specific' as the 1966 policy was. Therefore, the committee rejected option I because it did not meet their philosophical requirements, and option II because it was too narrow in scope.

Option III, then, was the only policy option seriously considered. The committee found it desirable because it met the above objectives. In terms of affordability, capital costs would be about 20 per cent higher than for general secondary schools, but recurrent costs would be about equal. The committee determined the desirability outweighed cost but believed it possible to cut costs further, and increase school fees to help finance the policy. Finally, the committee felt that implementation problems encountered in the pilot stage could be avoided.

Policy decision

The committee's recommendation to introduce diversified education on a nationwide basis was endorsed by the cabinet and became part of the National Development Plan. One of the most salient characteristics of this decision was that it built upon the first policy cycle. Through piloting the reform first, the authorities were able to gauge demand, and were also able to anticipate and address problems encountered at that time in the new reform. Though the original policy was largely inspired and promoted by the international community and derived from comprehensive schools in other countries, through the implementation process it had become a 'Thai product'. Finally, this reform was backed by individuals who had the will and the political wherewithal to see it through.

Planning implementation

Though the decision-making process itself was synoptic (see Chapter I), the approach to implementation was incremental, executed in a step-by-step manner which enabled lessons learned at one stage to be incorporated in the next. Planning for the reform was broadly sketched by the National Education Commission and the reform committee, but the nitty-gritty details including costing, etc., were specified by the Department of General Education.

Further elements of planning were carried out within the context of three World Bank-financed projects. Throughout implementation, local teachers and community leaders were consulted and involved, and a concerted effort was made to make the objectives of the reform clear to students and parents.

Policy impact assessment

The policy was evaluated routinely through government assessments, World Bank project reviews, and University of Alberta (Canada) studies. In assessing the results of the policy, the various interest groups (the Thai government, the World Bank and the Canadian government) generally found that most of their expectations for the policy, as determined during policy evaluation, had been met. To begin with, there continued to be a high demand for the schools as attested to by over-target enrolments, and opinion surveys showed that parents found the schools better than, or as good as, other secondary schools. Second, the schools were moderately successful in imparting vocational skills to students. However, the schools were not successful in changing students' career aspirations, and the majority of secondary graduates still preferred to continue their education at the tertiary level, instead of terminating their studies and entering the workforce. Finally, the policy advanced the national objectives of community development and contributed to maintaining country security.

IV. Burkina Faso: a case of an externally influenced comprehensive approach

At independence in 1960, the government of Upper Volta was faced with the need to expand primary education within the constraints of a severely limited national budget. The government accepted advice to institute a system of rural nonformal education to provide primary education to its rural people, while the small urban populations would continue to have access to traditional primary schools (*first policy cycle*). In the early 1970s, the government chose to continue these parallel systems with some qualitative reforms of rural education (*second policy cycle*). In

1986, the government shifted away from rural education and made formal schooling the dominant mode of primary education (*third policy cycle*).

First Policy Cycle

The situation leading to policy formulation in 1960 (Situation A)

Burkina Faso, formerly a French colony and known until 1983 as Upper Volta, became an independent republic in 1960. It was considered one of the poorest countries of the world due to its: landlocked location, poor soils, hard climate, water shortages, lack of known mineral resources, lack of educated and skilled manpower, high infant death rate, low life expectancy, and low GNP per capita.

Due to its lack of resources, Upper Volta received substantial foreign aid to finance public investment and balancing the national budget. This left the country very dependent on donor countries which wielded a great deal of influence on internal decision-making.

The Voltaic education system was based on the French model, providing six years of primary schooling and seven years of secondary schooling with a highly academic curriculum. Illiteracy was pervasive. The government was faced with the following constraints: (1) limited and inequitable access to education; (2) externally inefficient schools, because the academic nature of general education was more relevant to the small modern sector, but the quality did not equip students to cope with its requirements; and (3) internally inefficient schools with high rates of repetition and drop-out.

What was the potential for change? Parents' and students' expectations for change were heightened by the country's anticipated independence, but country conditions placed limitations. Economic constraints would limit adopting a costly and extensive reform; the educational system was small and little developed; and the government was highly centralized and local institutions had not

been developed, so that the onus of any reform would rest on Ouagadougou.

The generation of policy options

How to provide access to basic education to all children, given the severe economic constraints of the country, was the mission charged to a team of two French educators, experienced Africanists, who *a priori* felt that the French colonial (academic) pattern of schooling was inappropriate to the kind of development necessary in most of Africa, which was largely based on an agricultural economy. They visited the country for 45 days and gathered what little data existed on the population, the manpower needs, and the state of the economy. Due to a lack of data, they were forced to make 'best guesses' and, as they reported, many of their figures were gross estimations. They concluded that the high illiteracy rates in the rural areas and the lack of educational services were the major problems facing Voltaic education. More specifically, their study highlighted the lack of educational services, the external and internal inefficiencies, and the costliness of education. To respond to this situation, the team determined that the only three options were: (I) expanding the primary system of education so as to provide access to all; (II) introducing streaming after the third year of primary education; and (III) introducing an alternative system of education, a shorter programme of study with a more relevant curriculum.

Evaluation of policy options

A full evaluation of all three options was never conducted. The French experts, driven by a distinct philosophy which favoured *non-formal* education, dismissed out of hand as undesirable the option of providing universal access to *primary* (academic) education because the curriculum was irrelevant, and costly. The second option, to introduce streaming after the third year of primary education, was considered affordable, but was also rejected because it could encourage elitism, divisiveness and social conflict. The only alternative that was seriously considered, then, was a

programme of nonformal rural education which would provide literacy instruction and training in agricultural skills. This option was never actually evaluated in terms of its implications on *Situation A*. Rather, the decision was reasoned out from linear projections of population growth, growth of the economy and manpower needs. In comparison to primary education, rural nonformal education offered several advantages: it was more desirable (providing a more relevant education that could indirectly raise rural incomes and living standards); it would be more easily implemented (drawing upon human and natural resources which already existed in the rural areas) and it would be less costly (three years in comparison to six, capital costs would be minimal, and recurrent costs would be offset by productive activities of the schools). The team did not assess the reaction of parents but made two assumptions about them: that they would prefer access to a shortened (three year) education rather than no education at all, and that they would prefer to be taught by local residents who better understood them and their customs, rather than by graduates of the normal schools. Had a proper analysis of the existing situation been conducted and the appropriate implications been drawn, it would have been clear that, because formal education was regarded as the key to moving out of rural poverty, this was a fatal mistake.

Making the policy decision

In essence, the decision to institute a system of rural nonformal education was made *a priori*. The experts' report was approved by the Voltaic Legislative Assembly in late 1959, and rural nonformal education (a 3-year basic literacy and numeracy programme) was slated to become the dominant model of education.

The decision was reached through a 'synoptic' approach to policy making (see Chapter 1). The French team had developed what they thought to be a consistent, comprehensive and 'correct' solution to the problems in the education sector. This 'imported' policy came attached with funding from the French government, which greatly influenced the Voltaic government's decision. The policy was strategic in nature (as characterized in Chapter 1), represented a radical departure from the existing *Situation A*

(*Figure 3*), and was made without regard to the need for proper infrastructure to support it. All of this portended difficulties for implementation.

Planning policy implementation

Planning for the reform was done mainly by expatriates. A schedule was developed to run through 1969, which set targets for the number of centres, teachers, etc. Careful attention was also given to how the reform would be financed: savings from down-sizing of primary education, and substantial aid from the French and the European Economic Community. The designers of the plan felt confident that rural education would be welcomed by the peasants and so made no plans to 'market' it.

The radical nature of the reform made it exceedingly difficult to implement and the institutions created to administer it proved ineffective in dealing with problems as they arose. This led to a narrowing of the scope of the reform, and a *de facto* shift in support activities from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Agriculture.

Policy impact assessment

In the early 1970s, the government, with the assistance of the World Bank and UNESCO, evaluated the policy of rural nonformal education. Assessment revealed the following conditions in *Situation B*: (1) rural education had not had much of an influence on the economy, which had stagnated since independence, and low agricultural productivity continued to contribute to out-migration from the rural areas; (2) the performance of non-formal rural education was mixed – the centres had been able to keep costs down, but were able to reach only about one-fifth of the targeted population, achievement levels were mediocre, and the centres had gradually turned away from teaching agricultural skills and had become a poor substitute for primary education; and (3) primary education continued to suffer from problems of access, efficiency and cost.

Second Policy Cycle

New policy cycle: generating policy options

After evaluation of the reform, the government of Upper Volta found itself in much the same position as it had been at independence, and faced with two options: (I) to expand the primary education sector to meet the educational needs of the country, or (II) to continue with the alternative of rural nonformal education (with some modifications of the policy). The mixed results concerning the performance of rural nonformal education and the continued inefficiency and costliness of primary education would make it a difficult decision. Parents and students were losing faith in nonformal education which they evidenced through decreasing enrolments. The Ministry of Education (MNE), which had administrative control over the schools, was giving rural education the lowest possible priority rating. Despite that, the international and bilateral development agencies continued to encourage rural non-formal education. In many ways, they analyzed the situation just as the French experts did 10 years earlier using population and budget projections without taking account of popular views of the purposes of education.

Evaluation of policy options

The evaluation process greatly resembled the one that took place at independence. Expanding access to primary education was undesirable for reasons of external efficiency, and unaffordable based on possible budget growth. Policy option II was not fully evaluated in terms of its implications but the international donors strongly supported 'staying the course' with rural nonformal education for philosophical reasons. Further, policy-makers concluded that it would be five times less costly than primary education, was desirable because it would keep the youth in the rural areas, and most appealing of all, would be implementable because it would be supported by the international donor community. Though the Ministry of Education and parents and students continued to oppose the reform, rural education was entrusted to the

Ministry of Agriculture (MAE), with the encouragement of a number of donor agencies.

Making the policy decision

Though the MNE was opposed to nonformal education, the decision was taken at 'the highest level', and based on the financial support proposed. As a result, the government passed an education reform bill in 1975 which was basically a programme policy (discussed in Chapter I), addressing the questions of how and where rural education should be provided. The primary objective of the programme was to focus on qualitative reform, not expansion, of the existing system, and to help graduates of the system establish themselves on the land and/or in other revenue-earning enterprises. The decision had three major characteristics: it was comprehensive (synoptic) as it would cover all components of the rural education system, it was conceived of by sources outside the country who had not fully considered its feasibility, and it was alien to the population of Upper Volta.

Planning policy implementation

Expressing their enthusiasm for the policy, individual donor organizations began their own planning and implementation schedules for the reform even before the bill was passed and without any overarching blueprint for the reform. Furthermore, weaknesses in the comprehensive 'synoptic' approach began to show. Since it required complicated and delicate mechanisms and networks schedule, it proved to be beyond the Voltaic administrative capabilities, and changes at one step reverberated throughout the reform.

Policy impact assessment

In the early 1980s, the donors undertook a major assessment of the merits of rural nonformal education. Freed from their earlier philosophical predisposition, they found the outcomes of the policy to be seriously disappointing for a variety of reasons. First of all,

rural nonformal education proved to be undesirable because: (1) it had not significantly increased literacy; (2) it had not provided a quality alternative to the formal system – the rural population continued to reject this system because the quality was inferior to six years of primary education; (3) it had not significantly increased access to education in the rural areas; (4) it had not stemmed the tide of emigration. Further, post-school training programmes had not been successful in integrating school leavers into the agricultural sector. Second, it was judged unaffordable – the cost of a rural education was much higher than originally projected and, in fact, was greater than for primary education. Finally, rural education had made no apparent impact on the agricultural sector.

Third Policy Cycle

The new policy cycle

The government again confronted the strategic policy question of how to expand access to education without an increase in resources for education. The options were the same as before – (I) to continue to depend on rural education as a means of increasing educational opportunities, or (II) to abandon rural education in order to expand the formal system.

Analysis of the situation came from several sources. The Ministry of Education conducted its own research of the population, and held seminars and conferences to determine what type of reform to pursue. Though both alternatives were considered undesirable for cost and efficiency reasons, rural education was the least desirable, as noted above. Finally, Capt. Thomas Sankara came to power in a populist revolt, and he supported a more egalitarian form of education than the existing dual system. For these reasons the government turned its attention back to the formal system to determine ways in which primary education could be made a viable model for basic education on a large scale (the synoptic approach).

In order to facilitate the process of evaluating policy option II, a Computer Simulation Model was used by the major interest groups, including representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture,

Education and Higher Education, and Finance as well as from teachers' unions and private school owners, to assess the cost implications of various scenarios. The group went through a painful iterative process of evaluations, negotiations, modifications, 'tradeoffs' and so on. Finally, they agreed that Burkina Faso could accelerate the expansion of primary education most cost-effectively by: (1) lowering unit costs and (2) increasing resources to primary education through reallocating resources from other areas of education. Not surprisingly, the new policy met with some opposition, both from the Ministry of Agriculture, which was unprepared to give up on the rural education centres, and from the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, which did not approve of any attempts to cut back allocations to higher education. Whatever the final decision regarding non-formal rural education, one thing is certain: it takes some time to reverse a policy which already has a bureaucracy with a vested interest in seeing it continue.

The above four case studies illustrate, each in a specific way, the dynamics of policy formulation and planning over time, highlighting the interplay among actors and the interaction across processes. In the next section, the results of these studies are synthesized to draw lessons pertaining to potential success or failure of different policy planning approaches, and to derive specific implications for education planners.

Chapter III. Lessons from the cases

The country case studies in *Chapter II* vividly illustrate the utility of the two analytical instruments outlined in *Chapter I* – the model and the framework – in unravelling the policy-planning process. If we map the various policy-making cycles of each country on a graph (*Figure 4*), we find that most of them fall in quadrant I.

This indicates that much of the decision making was approached synoptically (i.e. comprehensively), and emanated from an organizational/bureaucratic source (e.g. the military, the donor community). Indeed, the organizational/bureaucratic mode (quadrants I and IV) was the prominent source of decision-making (six of the nine cycles fall here). Looking more closely, we see that this mode predominated in the early policy cycles in all four countries. This in part reflects their stage of development: in all except Peru, it was external parties, in concert with 'client' government officials, which dominated the process, because governments were at a relatively early stage of developing their national capacity. In Peru, the authoritarian military government was able to impose policy.

It was only further along in the process, as country governments developed their institutional capacity, that the societal/personalistic mode held sway (quadrant II). To examine the idea of system-wide reform in Thailand and Jordan, committees were constituted which represented a variety of interest groups, including teachers' unions, various members of education ministries, school and university administrators, etc. In both case, parents and students were also consulted, either at the policy formulation or policy implementation stage.



Figure 4. Mapping of decision making for policy-planning

In Burkina Faso, the international community brought together the various interest groups to generate and evaluate policy options. It seems unlikely that much policy making takes place in quadrant III. This is because incremental policy making is generally limited in its effects, and therefore does not incite the same level of political interest; for this reason it does not require the type of interaction and negotiation characterized by the societal/personalistic mode.

The organizational/bureaucratic mode intersected with the incremental approach in policy making in the first policy cycles of Jordan and Thailand. In both cases, pilot programmes were instituted by government officials together with international actors, in order to test the waters for system-wide reform. One of the major questions both countries needed to answer was whether or not a demand existed for the reform, and piloting permitted this. Furthermore, before broad-based reform could be introduced, negotiations among numerous interest groups had to take place.

The rest of this section looks closely at what can be concluded from applying the conceptual framework described in Chapter I to the different components of the policy-planning process in the cases of Peru, Thailand, Jordan, and Burkina Faso. Conclusions are drawn along two dimensions: (1) lessons derived from each case separately, and (2) lessons derived across cases in terms of each component of the conceptual framework.

Peru

The Peruvian reform clearly demonstrates a case of a highly calculated, systematic, internally consistent, and comprehensive mode of policy making. The case pivoted on a 'unitary, rational' revolutionary actor, the military government, who through a systematic and technical process of diagnosis, response and action went about finding the 'correct' solutions to educational problems, and radically reforming the system. Indeed, educational policies were formulated on the basis of a serious diagnosis of the economic, social and educational situation. Moreover, they were conceived within a carefully planned programme of action for reforming the whole national structure. Plans for the education sector itself were characterized by a high degree of internal logical deduction and comprehensive coverage.

Where was the fatal flaw? It seems that the apparent strength of the Peruvian approach to policy making was actually its main weakness. The initial mistake lay in the manner in which policy options had been generated by the military planners and their civilian advisors. Perhaps influenced by the top-down discipline of the military hierarchy, the government acted as if, once it had identified the best option for Peru, the citizenry would listen and respond to the new orders. To the extent that this did not happen, they reasoned, public education would surely convince people that they should support the new plan with enthusiasm. Missing was an understanding of the difficulty of rapidly altering basic cultural values and the profound nexus in the family between these values and parents' aspirations for their children. While the egalitarian revolutionary objectives of the new regime were applauded in principle by Peru's citizens, they clashed sharply with deeply held

individualist aspirations for securing social mobility. Rather than recognizing the importance of these values for its citizens and developing policy options which took them into account, the military regime concentrated on plans fitting with their deductively generated view of the needs of Peru as a collectivity. Despite elaborate efforts at consultation and public education, the Velasco regime could not convince enough Peruvian citizens that they and their families should, as individuals, actively participate in the government's revolutionary reform. This reluctance was particularly baffling to many of the government's military leaders because they noted broad support, in principle, for their reform.

The process of making the policy decision was, itself, a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. The strengths largely derived from the broad based and lengthy attempts at consultation carried out by the military regime as well as the clarity of the ultimate decision as articulated in the 1972 decree-law. The weakness was in the inability of the military to see, as a result of the undercurrent of dissatisfaction present from the beginning to the end of its consultations, that the reform was too revolutionary to be accepted by its citizens, at least in the short run. In addition, to make matters worse, to the extent that the government was aware of the improbability of success, it decided on a process of staged implementation. This allowed citizens and communities who preferred Peru's traditional educational system to the regime's revolutionary reform to exercise their opposition.

Once the decision had been made and plans for implementation were drawn up, the process mirrored those of generating and evaluating policy options. Goals were set and committed reformers moved full steam ahead to make plans to implement them. Reluctantly, they were slowed down by signs of popular nonsupport and erosion of foreign support. Foreign help was particularly crucial for the most experimental aspects of the reform such as the ESEP professional education schools. Doubts about the feasibility of the reform's objectives slowed down the flow of foreign technical and financial support which initially had hailed the Peruvian experiment as path breaking for its plans to implement diversified education full-scale. By the time

Fernando Belaunde Terry had returned to power in 1980, only a ghostly skeleton of the 1972 reform had been implemented.

All this points to the vital linkages between the educational system and the socio-politico-economic structure. Any policy change, therefore, is not purely technical or unitarily rational. Different interest groups each have their own legitimate 'rationality' for understanding and responding to an educational initiative. Rather than perfecting the 'correct' reform to be implemented by obedient managers, and converting the public to the unitary rationality, it is certainly more productive, in the long run, to seek to understand the processes through which *tradeoffs* are accomplished among the interests underlying the various rationalities relevant to a given policy choice.

Jordan

The Jordanian case illustrates how the policy-planning process itself (and the actors involved) can change over time. The process evolved from a limited incremental approach, essentially directed by the international community, to a comprehensive synoptic approach, with input from all of the relevant interest groups, domestic and international. These concepts are elaborated below.

The government took the more conservative incremental approach to introducing comprehensive education in the 1970s, in large part due to the murkiness of the prevalent situation. Therefore, it was more sensible to proceed in a cautious manner. The concept of comprehensive schools was opted for in a tentative manner and was introduced incrementally, sequentially and in a limited scope.

Certainly this approach to policy development proved advantageous in many respects: (a) there was no need for long-term and elaborate planning at the national level – only at the project level; (b) implementation would be relatively easy because no national or conceptual reform was involved; (c) no political mobilization or intense bureaucratic negotiations were necessary; and (d) no major institutional changes were needed to accommodate the policy modifications. In addition, little political opposition was anticipated; because of the limited risks involved, no group felt the need

to present its case in terms of comparative advantages and disadvantages of the policies under consideration.

On the negative side, there were disadvantages to the incremental approach: because it was very 'low risk', the government was not as inclined to invest much in terms of political capital or other resources to carry it off successfully. This resulted in poor planning which impeded implementation. Further, because it was an 'isolated' response to the imbalance between the needs of the economy and the output of the education system, apparently affecting only a sub-sector of the system, implications for the rest of the system were not drawn.

In comparison, the second cycle demonstrates a more highly calculated, systematic and comprehensive mode of policy making. Its success depended on three things: First of all, it was reached after an exhaustive process of review, assessment, and analysis of the education system that included high level representatives from both the public and private sectors. Second, even though it was comprehensive and strategic, as in the earlier cycle it also incorporated a phased implementation plan; experience in each phase was to be systematically monitored and evaluated and the results used as feedback for modifications of future phases. Finally, the process was driven by a combination of strong political will at the highest levels, and a sophisticated, technical machinery – the Centre for Research and Development.

Thailand

As in the case of Jordan, the process of introducing diversified education into Thailand demonstrates an evolving approach to policy making. In the mid 1960s, the national objectives were rather narrow (concerning manpower needs), so the government adopted an 'issue-specific' policy. The approach at this point was incremental and conservative – the government wished to see how diversified education would be accepted, and viewed this as a pilot programme. The policy then evolved over time and took on more of a Thai character, with wider 'strategic' objectives. During the second policy cycle, when the government was reviewing whether to carry on with diversified education or to abandon the effort, it

had several objectives to meet: manpower needs, national unity and educational equity. Therefore, the policy had to be 'strategic' in order to meet this diversity of objectives. Again as in Jordan, implementation throughout the two policy cycles was incremental.

Why did the authorities succeed better with diversified education in Thailand than in other countries where it was tried? To begin with, the Thais did not make it a second class education, open chiefly for academic failures. They did not trade *access* to education for *quality*. The diploma of the diversified schools was fully equal to that of the college preparatory schools. In addition, diversified education was not a terminal programme, liable to be seen as a dead-end. There was a great deal of flexibility in the new curriculum which required students to take practical courses, but still enabled them to go on to university, if they chose.

Second, because the policy was initially narrow in scope, or incremental, it did not provoke the type of controversy or violent reaction that a more comprehensive, synoptic approach might have.

Third, the policy was considered at a national level, that is to say from a synoptic approach, only after limited pilot projects had proved it to be successful. The incremental nature of the first cycle gave the Thais an opportunity to test the acceptance of the policy. The promise of financial support from the international community which was promoting diversified education at this time certainly tipped the balance in favour of this policy, and limited the way in which other options were evaluated. However, the Thai education authorities did not just accept project loan money but experimented with pilot programmes, to see if they could build a demand for this type of education. When they achieved acceptance and demand, they built a consensus within the government and within the donor community, and eventually came up with a policy that had a definitive Thai character.

Fourth, the incremental nature of implementation allowed a 'learning by doing', and the Thais benefitted from the opportunity of making changes based on feedback as the policy progressed. Though not necessarily inherent to the incremental implementation approach, the implementation process in Thailand contributed greatly to the success of the policy. The decision to make diversified education the predominant mode of secondary schooling was

made at the central level, by the reform committee; however, during implementation local providers and consumers of education were included in the process.

It is surprising to see how much weight was placed on the criterion of desirability over the criteria of implementability and affordability in evaluating policy options, especially in the second cycle. Though a few schools had successfully adopted the diversified curriculum in the early 1970s, it had been quite expensive to do so and it was not clear that the policy would be capable of being implemented universally *and* at a lesser cost. The government was certainly taking a risk with this decision, but behind it lay the belief that it was the right one for secondary education in Thailand. The success of diversified education in Thailand when it has failed in most other countries, clearly underscores the crucial role of the policy decision making and implementation process, but does not necessarily attest to the merit of the educational model itself.

Burkina Faso

The introduction of rural non-formal education into Upper Volta (first and second policy cycles) clearly demonstrates a case of a synoptic approach to policy making with a twist: one driven by external forces. The international actors were working within a mindset which assumed that (1) there are universal concepts, or an internationally collected wisdom, which applies to any given situation, and (2) that this wisdom can be transferred into any country. In essence, they felt that, once one had a clear idea of the problem, the appropriate solution could simply be taken off the shelf, so to speak. Afterwards, all that was necessary would be to provide technical assistance and funding – with little attention paid to the country's demands and constraints.

On the surface, it appeared that such a system of education would provide a more relevant form of basic education at a cost that the new government could afford. This policy had all the elements of success: international respectability, financial backing and a good chance for implementation because of the support of several large international organizations. In addition, the synoptic

approach employed in the policy-making process provided some advantages. First, the comprehensive nature of the reform helped create a critical mass which is necessary to any successful policy implementation. Second, the reform placed special emphasis on institutional development. With all these advantages, why did the policy fail?

There were several fatal weaknesses in the policy-making process. The major flaw was that demand factors were totally ignored. The decision revolved around the experts' detailed examination of the situation. Though they briefly entertained ideas concerning alternative policy options, their biases predisposed them to favouring rural non formal education as the 'correct and only' solution to the problem. Therefore, they assumed that consumers of education would embrace it. In the decision-making process, the government did not draw the proper implications from this option, overlooking the fact that it might be rejected by parents and students, because denying them access to the formal educational system would close off the only door to escape from their difficult subsistence existence.

There is an important lesson here. Interest groups must be dealt with in the policy process, otherwise they will use everything within their power to manipulate the policy to meet their own objectives. In the case of Burkina Faso, parents used the only means at their disposal to interfere with the reform – passive resistance. Rural teachers made up another interest group that was ignored in the decision-making process. These teachers subsequently demanded that they be treated like primary teachers, accorded the same status and salary, which made the reform financially unviable. Neither donors nor decision-makers in Burkina Faso saw the importance of bringing interest groups into the original decision-making process. Particularly after the first policy cycle, when they could see that rural education was not widely accepted, they identified the 'salesman' as the problem instead of the 'product': instead of recognizing that rural education was not being accepted in the countryside, because people did not want it, the decision-makers identified the Ministry of Education as the problem. To their way of thinking, the Ministry of Education was not successful in 'selling' the reform, so they simply switched

salesmen (to the Ministry of Agriculture) and continued to attempt to get the consumers of education to 'buy' the reform.

Second, the introduction and reform of rural non formal education were led by the international donor community; in this respect, the government was a 'follower' in the policy-making process. Once the donors entered the policy-making process, the scales were tilted. In effect, the international community's intervention in the policy process stifled it. The Voltaic government did not bother to analyze the implications of the reform, since aid organizations were going to fund it. The fact that the policy was a creation of external players meant that the country itself was not necessarily committed to it – Upper Volta had no feeling of 'owning' this policy.

Third, the introduction of rural non formal education was so far-reaching that it was beyond the analytical and managerial capabilities of the Voltaic authorities to design and to implement.

The third cycle demonstrates a departure from the earlier model of policy making. The government of Burkina Faso came to recognize the importance of the interaction among different interest groups, the many dimensions of policy making (the social, political, and financial aspects), and the importance of both providers and consumers of education. The process of the analytical evaluation of the different policy scenarios was greatly aided by a Computer Simulation Model. It is too early, however, to assess the degree of sustainability of this approach in generating a policy that is socially and politically desirable, financially affordable, and nationally implementable and sustainable.

Synthesis across cases

The rest of this section synthesizes what can be learned from the four cases, summarized in Chapter II, about how policies originate and how planning results lead to a new cycle of policy analysis and formulation. The synthesis revolves around the seven elements of the conceptual framework of policy analysis (Chapter I) as applied across the cases.

Analysis of the existing situation

How are educational problems identified and analyzed, and how does a policy cycle begin or recommence? In most cases, analysis covered the education sector, as well as socio-political-economic factors. However, in spite of its importance, there was very little appraisal of the forces for (or against) change, to assess the feasibility of success of policy reform. None of the four countries took full account of interest groups in the first policy cycle. At independence in Burkina Faso, French experts arrived in the country and conducted their analysis independently of any local interests, most importantly students and their parents. Similarly in Peru, the military government conducted its own analysis of the education system purposefully omitting teachers and administrators as they were viewed to be obstacles to change. In both instances, the reforms ran into implementation problems and in the end were unsuccessful due in no small measure to the failure to create demand among those neglected in the process. Successful policy-planning should take into account the dynamics for change and the concerns of the various interest groups.

Of importance to this discussion is the nature of the state as an institution – it can be either conducive to, or resistant to, change. For example, in Peru, the fact that the military government was highly centralized meant that it could, at least in theory, more easily introduce system-wide reform. In contrast, more socially and politically conservative societies, such as existed in Thailand and Jordan, were compelled to tread more cautiously when it came to educational reform.

The process of generating policy options

This stage involves two issues: first, how thorough was the analysis that prompted a policy change and second, how were policy options formulated? Cases consistently demonstrated that policy options were not derived from a high quality, knowledge-based, 'home grown' analysis. In the case of the first policy cycle in Jordan, actual data collection and analysis were skimpy due to the unstable political situation at the time. Policy-makers here

depended more on international opinion. Similarly in Thailand, though data were more readily available, they were viewed through the prism of international experts. In Peru, a number of reports were commissioned over a period of three years that were all conceived of and executed within a revolutionary framework. This certainly biased the analysis and the eventual process of generating and evaluating possible policies to address the country's problems. Finally, in Burkina Faso, the foreign experts admitted that many of their figures were 'best guesses'. The government's later move to refocus on primary education was partly a result of a Ministry of Education nationwide survey, conducted through conferences and seminars, to determine what kind of education was needed and desired by the country.

As far as formulation of policy options is concerned, the case studies clearly show that, in practice, there is no *systemic mode* whereby data is generated, and then a full range of options is formulated, prioritized, and refined. A limited number of policy options were usually contrived, determined by the ideologies of the actors. In Peru, the military government had devised an overall approach to social reform within whose framework educational reform had to be fitted, thus significantly narrowing the range of options. In the first policy cycles in both Burkina Faso and Peru, policy options other than those promoted by the French in the case of the former, and the military government in the case of the latter, were dismissed out of hand. In both countries, these policies met with failure. There was a wider range of policy options generated in Jordan and Thailand, and in both countries the reform introduced initially survived and was expanded in the second cycle.

In the cases analyzed here, the predominant mode was *importation*, whereby the policy option or options were introduced by the international donor community. The stage of development a country has reached is crucial in this regard. For example, in Jordan and Thailand the leverage of the international actors diminished as their national capacity evolved. By the second policy cycle in each country it was government officials who took the lead in policy making. However, in Burkina Faso the international donor community continued to hold sway. External involvement such as that introduced by the *importation mode* can be positive if

it is *one* input to the process, and if the product is allowed to be internalized; it can serve as a way for international organizations to 'connect' the developing countries to the world system, and to provide cross-fertilization among countries. If care is not taken, however, external influence can be a means by which the international community imposes its fads and fashions upon less developed countries.

The process of evaluating policy options

Further dispelling the myth of the technical or scientific approach to policy making in which policy-makers attempt to project and evaluate objectively the consequences of each possible option, in no case were the consequences of policy options fully drawn and non-prejudicially weighed. In fact, such narrow evaluation was heavily influenced by the values and ideologies of the various interest groups involved. For example, the military government in Peru did not even allow for a full evaluation of the one policy option under consideration. In the three other cases presented (the first policy cycles in Burkina Faso, Thailand and Jordan), international actors predominated in policy option evaluation. In the end their particular ideologies prevailed, largely because of the funding attached. The most extreme example of foreign influence over the evaluation phase is found in Burkina Faso's second policy cycle. When the Ministry of Education had decided that rural education was neither desirable nor feasible, the international actor found another client ministry which embraced it, to lend support to the policy.

When policy options are evaluated in terms of their desirability, the obvious question that needs to be posed is desirable to whom? In a number of cases policy-makers found a particular option desirable while the consumers of education (students and parents) did not. Where demand did not exist for a particular policy or was not generated through the inclusion of the consumers in the process, the policy was doomed to failure. Such was the case when rural non formal education was introduced in Burkina Faso, and when diversified secondary schooling was introduced in Peru, as part of system-wide reform. In the case of Peru, though the government

did allow two years of public and professional informal discussions of the reform, suggestions made during this time were not integrated into the policy design. Rather, ad hoc responses were devised with the purpose of avoiding rejection or opposition. It is in the later policy cycles that governments recognized and sought to address the multiplicity of interests involved in policy making.

Adoption of the policy decision

Analysis of the policy choice itself brings up issues related to the degree of radicality and clarity of the decision as well as its implementability. These studies have shown that incremental policy making in the initial policy cycle is more successful than radical change. Piloting of projects in Thailand and Jordan enabled policy-makers to refine policies through implementation that fed into the subsequent policy cycles. In both cases where the synoptic approach was taken, the first cycles of Peru and Burkina Faso, the policies later ended in failure. There is decidedly a relationship between the governmental structure and the approach it chooses in policy making. Authoritative governments are more inclined to follow a synoptic approach in policy making, whereas governments whose political power is more disparate are more likely to opt for the incremental approach.

The extent to which the policy is articulated clearly contributes to its success, although governments sometimes intentionally opt for ambiguity to secure political acceptance for policies more easily. Peru's decision to introduce secondary comprehensive education was overly theoretical – how goals could realistically be achieved was overlooked, posing problems for implementation. In contrast, the incremental approach pursued by Jordan and Thailand made for a better articulated and therefore more easily implementable policy. Undoubtedly, policies which are conservative and incremental, and especially those launched as pilot projects, have the most chance for success.

Finally, the question of whether the policy seems operational or implausible to implement is certainly in the eye of the beholder. Objectively, where the reform is comprehensive and synoptic, and the absorptive capacity of the country is meager, or where there is

no demonstrated demand for the policy, the less the likelihood of its success. This was made quite clear in Upper Volta. In this case, the introduction of rural non formal education was so far-reaching that it was beyond the analytical and managerial capabilities of the newly independent government to design and to implement. However, as indicated above, some policy-makers felt that through careful planning, as in Peru, or simply because they believed the policy to be the correct one, as in Upper Volta, they could make a particular policy work.

Policy planning and implementation

The true test of a policy comes during planning and implementation. Two major issues related to planning policy implementation have presented themselves as critical. The first involves the degree to which political support has been mobilized for the reform, and the second is the complementarity of micro- and macro-planning. In Thailand, even in the first cycle, policy planners saw the need to involve administrative staff in the process, and developed a project centre that would allow supervisors the opportunity to pursue research and plan for the development of the schools, and to assist in the improvement of teaching in the project schools. In the second policy cycle, the reform committee comprised representatives from a broad range of interest groups, including teachers' unions, private schools, universities and the National Economic and Social Development Board. So, from an early time, those who would be affected by the reform were brought in to help decide what form it would take. In addition, planning was to be a continuous process, leaving room for modifications to take place as feedback from the field came in. At the planning and implementation stages, local teachers were consulted over curriculum redesign and assessment; business leaders provided technical and administrative support, and community leaders helped to disseminate information to the local public on area vocational centres and their functions. Finally, throughout implementation, a concerted effort was made to make the objectives of the reform clear to students and parents. In particular, schools would offer 'training and awareness' programmes, presenting workshop simulations and the

like, which would give people in towns and villages the opportunity to observe the schools in action. In addition, an important aspect of the reform was the introduction of a strong guidance component to help the 'consumers' make best use of the 'product'. After students were tested and streamed in the vocational or academic track, guidance counsellors were there to explain the results to the students and their parents, and to help the students choose the best course of study. In the case of Jordan, no marketing was done in the first stage; the country profited from this mistake, and in the second policy cycle, a considerable effort was made to involve all – a free exchange of ideas concerning the system was afforded for education authorities, parents and teachers and members of the reform commission (via workshops and seminars), and the Crown Prince himself met with local and regional administrators for this purpose.

However, mobilizing political support does not guarantee acceptance of the reform – in Peru, before a decision had actually been made regarding educational reform, members of the Reform Commission selected a group of young men and women to sensitize and mobilize the public to support the general national reform. When the education reform was being mapped out, planners clarified the objectives, benefits and roles for teachers, administrators, and community members. Incentives were designed to motivate teachers to gain additional training and to participate in the more innovative aspects of the reform, and community members were canvassed about the new opportunities and responsibilities embodied in the reform. This was largely done in a top-down manner, which meant that there was very little opportunity for input from the general population; this reform, as noted above, subsequently failed.

The second issue regarding complementarity of macro (national) planning with micro (project) planning proved to be a problem for a number of countries. Allowing major planning to take place at the project (micro) level encourages local participation, but it does not deal adequately with national (macro) problems. Without detailed plans at the national level, the Jordanian education system found itself short of vocational education teachers. In Burkina Faso's second policy cycle, inadequate overall development

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planning on the part of the government resulted in disjointed implementation.

It is during implementation that the formulation of a policy is put to the test. As noted in Chapter I, modification of policy inevitably occurs during the implementation phase. This is due to a number of factors, including the fact that the attempt to implement encounters unanticipated constraints; political, social, or economic circumstances change; or feedback causes a reassessment of the original policy decision. The case studies show that implementation carried out on a 'learning by doing' step-by-step basis which permits modification, has a better chance of success than a massive, unitary approach. In Peru, policy implementation was not planned so that policy improvement could take place; the reform was intended to be implemented in a single effort, and this approach to planning diminished the flexibility and learning possibilities in the implementation stages. In addition, a declining political situation, as well as a declining domestic and international economy and extreme financial problems affected support for and consequently implementation of the reform in the country. In the end, the government decided to scratch the idea of system-wide reform in favour of setting up a limited number of experimental schools.

The cost of building comprehensive schools in Thailand during the first cycle was found to be much greater than anticipated, which threatened to derail the reform. For this reason, building plans were changed; later, during the second cycle, a much less expensive prototype design was developed as well as an alternative and cheaper means of providing practical instruction.

In Jordan, implementation of comprehensive education met a snag when the need for vocational teachers was greater than the supply, as pointed out above. This illustrates the downside of the incremental approach to policy making – governments do not feel as committed because they don't have as much invested in the decision. Therefore, there is a tendency to give the policy inadequate resources. To remedy this situation, the government had to adopt a number of incentive measures to attract and retain qualified vocational/technical teachers. Further, as part of its pilot effort the government introduced another form of comprehensive schooling,

the general vocational secondary school, as a way to serve thinly populated areas. As discovered during the policy impact assessment stage (see below), this experiment was not successful because it suffered from the same problems as other comprehensive schools – these schools did not fit the demand by students for a solid general education for all. In the subsequent policy cycle the demand factor was taken very seriously, which contributed to its success.

Finally, what looks good on paper does not necessarily work in the real world. Such was the case with Peru, as elaborated above. In Burkina Faso, though non-formal rural education appeared to be 'objectively' the best solution to the country's dilemma, the radical reform introduced was simply beyond the analytical and managerial capabilities of the country to implement. Though the international aid community strongly believed in and promoted this policy, they could not cover every aspect of implementation. In the subsequent policy cycle the same problem was multiplied by the expansion of the reform, the lack of coordination among the even larger number of international agencies involved in its implementation, and the fact that the government itself had not fully developed a reform plan.

Policy impact assessment and subsequent policy cycle

Assessing the impact of a policy is obviously important in order to determine whether to maintain, modify, or reject it. In general, policy assessments were not carried out as a 'matter of course' in the policy-making process. Often no official assessment was made at all, and the policy was allowed to linger, while new policies are introduced alongside. Where an assessment was made, however, three issues needed to be analyzed: what prompted the assessment; how was it conducted and by whom; and how were the results interpreted – were deficiencies attributed to implementation or policy?

Most assessments that were conducted in the cases studied were precipitated by events external to the education sector. One of the strongest examples is the case of Jordan, where educational reform became a source of concern in the mid-1980s, only after the

country began to experience a serious economic slowdown and a growing unemployment problem. Though the idea for a similar reform had been broached in the late 1970s, it was economic difficulty that forced a reassessment of the situation and created a more receptive environment for the idea. In Peru, Burkina Faso, and Thailand, political events brought about policy assessments. In Thailand and the second policy cycle in Burkina Faso, populist demand for democracy brought about the toppling of the governments, ushering in new administrations. They were forced to assess the existing education system largely on equity grounds and to respond to popular demand for change. In Peru, though no formal evaluation was made, the political situation (after a forced election) led to the decision to allow the policy of diversified education to languish. One danger with this external prompting is that assessment is conducted prematurely and before a policy has had time to take roots and produce results.

How, when, and by whom the assessment is conducted clearly prejudices the findings and the subsequent policy cycle. Political factors influence who will perform the assessment as well. For example, an assessment performed at the end of Burkina Faso's first policy cycle was carried out by the international community, which was predisposed to continue rural, non-formal education. This biased their results and contributed to the policy's longevity. Though the Ministry of Education had carried out its own evaluation and had determined that the policy was neither desired by students and their parents, nor affordable, it was international aid that held sway with government decision-makers. When the international ideology began to change, reasserting the importance of universal primary education, the international community's assessment of rural non formal education in Burkina Faso changed accordingly. Policy assessment in Jordan was conducted by the National Commission to Assess Educational Policies, constituted by the Crown Prince, as part of the educational reform process. In this case, the Crown Prince had already determined that policy change was in order, before an assessment of existing policy even took place. In Thailand, though the policy of diversified education had been introduced largely because it was promoted by the international community, the government retrieved control of the

policy and adapted it to Thai needs. Its assessment, and the subsequent policy cycle reflected more closely the demand issues in Thai education.

Interpretation of the results of the assessment has a very strong influence on what comes next. There are three possibilities: first, that the policy is right on course and should be maintained; second, that the policy outcome is lacking due to problems of implementation and therefore should be modified; and third, that the policy outcome is poor due to the nature of the policy itself, and therefore it should be rejected. When the outcome was not what was expected, often policy-makers did not get to the heart of the matter, mistaking implementation problems for inadequacies of the policy itself, which led to a decision to abandon it. As an example, in Peru, the military government was ousted eight years after comprehensive education was initiated; the new President interpreted this as a rejection of the policy, even though the first students had not yet graduated from the ESEPs. Due to the comprehensive nature of the intended reform, this does not appear to have been an appropriate time for making such a decision. Of the four case studies, only in Burkina Faso was a decision made to modify the implementation of an existing policy, during the second cycle; even in this case, there was a difference in the interpretation of the assessment. The Ministry of Education had concluded that the policy was defective and called for abandoning it, but because the international donor community believed that only implementation was at fault, they continued to back rural non-formal education.

Chapter IV. Conclusion – summary implications for planners

The conceptual framework for policy analysis and its application to the four exemplary cases vividly indicate that education planning cannot be purely technical or linear. It deals with an educational enterprise that is not characterized by unambiguous issues, clearly defined objectives, undisputed causal relationships, predictable rationalities and rational decision-makers. Education policy planning, as such, is by necessity a series of untidy and overlapping episodes in which a variety of people and organizations with diversified perspectives are actively involved in the *processes* through which issues are analyzed and *policies* are generated, implemented, assessed and adjusted or redesigned. Education planners thus need a methodological approach, similar to the one presented in *Chapter I*, to capture the intricacies of both policies and processes, to give deliberate attention to every element of the policy-planning process, and to gauge the evolving dynamics of the system (flow, procedure, form, and interaction among interest groups).

The above analyses have also made clear that the policy-planning processes are country-specific (even time bound) and are highly dependent on sectoral, economic and socio-political conditions and interactions. Certain recurring factors could, however, be discerned that have strong implications for effective education planning.

First, education policy development should be based on solid knowledge along three dimensions: (a) a diagnosis of the sector itself drawing on data, research, experience and international knowledge; (b) contextual analysis of the economic, political,

demographic, social and cultural conditions and prospects; and (c) an assessment of the interest groups, their rationalities and roles in education change, and the processes through which trade-offs are accomplished among them. This contextual analysis, may be influenced by external sources, but to be effective should be internalized and locally owned.

Second, before a policy decision is made, different viable policy options need to be generated. This is the easy part. What is more difficult is to construct scenarios around each option to determine requirements and consequences. Each scenario should be systematically analyzed and evaluated, not only in terms of the educational merit of the policy proposal but also in terms of its desirability (taking into consideration the multiplicity of interests involved), financial affordability, feasibility in terms of the implementation capacity of the country, and sustainability over a sufficient period of time to show results. The selection of the optimal option will continue to be ultimately political, but a rigorous analysis of different scenarios, based on reasonably good knowledge, enlightens the political decision-making process and allows the different interest groups to be engaged in consultations in a meaningful manner.

Third, how radical and comprehensive should a policy choice be? It is not obvious that an incremental issue-specific approach is always superior to a comprehensive strategic approach. Certainly, a comprehensive strategic reform is unlikely to succeed where the absorptive capacity of the country is meager or where there is no demonstrated demand for the policy. A step-by-step approach allows experimentation and adjustment and does not have high political and institutional demands. On the other hand, this approach may lead to 'low risk' quick-fixes, and inadequate investment in terms of political capital and other resources to carry the reform off successfully. The success stories of the case studies have shown that to solve sector-wide problems in the context of political and economic demands, it is prudent to start with a limited incremental phase, but this should be succeeded in time by a comprehensive strategic approach. The timing and speed of this evolution should be gauged to the degree of acceptability of the

reform by the stakeholders, and the implementation capacity of the system.

Fourth, whether a policy reform is incremental or comprehensive, its true test comes during planning and implementation. Here, three factors proved to be crucial: (a) Macro planning, to address national problems and provide an overarching blueprint, must be complemented (and not substituted) by micro planning at the project and local level; (b) Mobilization of political and public support should be deliberately planned for and sought and, during the planning and implementation stage, stakeholders should be actively involved; (c) Planning should be flexible, leaving room for modifications during implementation.

Fifth, when a policy goes into effect, it is not the end of the policy-planning process; it is the beginning of a new chapter. Policy reforms should be systematically assessed, preferably with a built-in mechanism, in terms of their impact; is it achieving what was expected of it at the time of its adoption? While implementation mechanisms need to be reviewed continuously, policies themselves should be allowed to mature before a judgement is passed on their impact. Even then, implementation problems should not be mistaken for inadequacies of the policy itself. Even if impact assessment concludes that the desired changes have been successfully implemented, policy-makers and planners should maintain vigilance for new changes required, given the rapid pace of contemporary society and the intimate links between an educational system and its environment. Finally, if a policy is determined to be ineffective, it should not be allowed to linger while new policies are introduced alongside. Instead, a new cycle of rigorous policy design, formulation and planning must be initiated.

In conclusion, educational development is extraordinarily complicated because it involves and affects a large number of beneficiaries and providers, as well as political figures, all of whom have a stake in the process and the outcome. Added to this is the long gestation period for any policy to realize its objectives. For these reasons, policy change should not be introduced lightly, nor should it be abandoned without careful examination.

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The booklet

This booklet analyzes the actions of policy-makers and the decisions they make regarding educational change. The policy-making process, like educational development itself, is not a straightforward, easily understandable process. To help one better comprehend the disorderly and overlapping manner in which educational decisions are made, Haddad and Demsky present a framework which clarifies the complex reality of policy making: what it is preceded by (analysis of options) and what follows. To provide a clearer understanding of the process, the framework is applied to case studies. Finally, lessons are drawn for educational planners.

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